v2.0 — 31 C POC twins + harness fixes

- 31 C POC files, one per CVE folder: full seed construction + trigger +
  main(), self-contained, no app dependency. All compile clean with
  clang -O2 -Wall (zero warnings) on macOS arm64; each has a recorded
  oracle on this host.
- CMGetDMVersionLevelFromRPU ABI pinned by disassembly: macOS export is
  (CFDataRef), the Swift POC drives the 4-arg iOS surface — this is the
  mechanism behind the cm.rpu death oracle on the simulator build.
- Harness fixes: glyphCount guard, MachOInspector size guard, ModTools
  clamp, DeviceModel iPhone19,7, GPTPayload clamps, Gate patch display.
- POC comments rewritten English-only (31 swift + arc.rr + 5 py).
- README (en/zh): C twin column, .c anatomy section, compile/run
  examples, C oracle verification status.
- Dead if-let binding removed from Identity summary; v2.0 build 3.

CVE-2026-112706/CVE-2026-112706.swift

@@ -1,25 +1,8 @@
 // cm.fdleak · CoreMedia · mediaplaybackd.bytestream.xpc · CVE-2026-112706
-// 原语: 信息泄露 · 系统进程 · tier 1
-// Primitive: info leak · system process · tier 1
-//
-// [zh] CoreMedia bytestream XPC 跨沙盒文件描述符获取
-//
-// [en] CoreMedia bytestream XPC cross-sandbox file descriptor acquisition
-// The launchd service com.apple.coremedia.mediaplaybackd.bytestream.xpc is reachable from any sandboxed
-// third-party app, checks no entitlement and raises no permission prompt. Its FigXPC memory-origin
-// handshake (.rp1 → .rp2 → .org) returns status 0 for an unprivileged client; the subsequent 'Curl'
-// create message carries a client-chosen absolute file:// path in CreationURL, and the daemon opens
-// that path with its own credentials without checking either that it lies inside the requesting app's
-// container or that the requester can read it. The reply's ByteStreamDetails dictionary carries a
-// live FileDescriptor. The app dups it and preads — descriptor-level I/O is not subject to the client
-// sandbox's path checks, so the full contents of a file the app's own open() returns EPERM for land
-// in the app container.
-// ── 判别 / oracle ──
-//  变体 cm.fdleak.boundary: 跨沙盒可读域边界测绘
-
+// CoreMedia bytestream XPC cross-sandbox file descriptor acquisition
 import Foundation
 
-// ── byte helpers — verbatim from Cinder27 Sources/Kit.swift ──
+// ── byte helpers (from Cinder27 Sources/Kit.swift) ──
 enum B {
     static func be16(_ v: UInt16) -> [UInt8] { [UInt8(v >> 8 & 0xff), UInt8(v & 0xff)] }
     static func le16(_ v: UInt16) -> [UInt8] { [UInt8(v & 0xff), UInt8(v >> 8 & 0xff)] }
@@ -40,20 +23,4 @@ enum B {
     static func ascii(_ s: String) -> [UInt8] { Array(s.utf8) }
 }
 
-/*
-// cm.fdleak.boundary · CoreMedia · mediaplaybackd.bytestream.xpc · CVE-2026-112706
-// 原语: 探测 · 系统进程 · tier 2
-// Primitive: probe · system process · tier 2
-//
-// [zh] 跨沙盒可读域边界测绘
-//
-// [en] Cross-sandbox readable domain boundary mapping
-// Fifteen high-value targets are each given a 'Curl' probe and the daemon's server-side error code
-// is recorded, fixing the primitive's actual readable domain. Three outcomes are distinguished: opens,
-// exists but denied (-12203), does not exist (-17913). The value of this pass is that it leaves
-// the negative results on record — a target that was refused and a target that was never tested are
-// entirely different conclusions.
-*/
-
-