v2.1 — CVE-2026-112705 / 112621 / 84636

Three public research arrivals, each with a .swift and .c POC folder:

- CVE-2026-112705 (AppleAVE2 NumberOfTemporalLayers): app split into a
  property probe (ave.ntl) and a deliberate fire module (ave.ntl.fire);
  C twin carries a --force-host gate because a frame submit reaches the
  same driver that panicked the dev Mac, so the host only builds it
- CVE-2026-112621 (LinkPresentation LPAnimatedImageTranscoder): 256x16 ->
  256x48 container, loopback og:image delivery, LPMetadataProvider; probe
  checks the pool math, fire runs the real transcode; C twin reproduces the
  48-row clear against a guard page (32,768 B past the 16,384-byte pool)
- CVE-2026-84636 (configd dynamic store): SSID + router MAC without the
  wifi-info entitlement, compared in-process with CNCopyCurrentNetworkInfo

56 modules, 34 CVE folders, 45 Swift POC files, 34 C twins. Device IPA
2.1 build 4; simulator regression: sc.dynamicstore / ave.ntl / lp.heic all
done (overflow=32768, NTL refused 0/4 on the simulator's encoder path).
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JBJF committed 2026-10-31 15:27:09 +08:00
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[中文](README.zh-CN.md)
An iOS 17.0–27.1 vulnerability-verification and device-modification lab, **51 modules**. Primary target: **iOS 27.0.1 / iPhone 18 Pro Max** (iPhone19,7 · 24A446).
An iOS 17.0–27.1 vulnerability-verification and device-modification lab, **56 modules**. Primary target: **iOS 27.0.1 / iPhone 18 Pro Max** (iPhone19,7 · 24A446).
Component coverage: ImageIO, CoreGraphics, CoreMedia, FontParser, ArchiveUtility, VideoToolbox, AudioToolbox, Calendar, Dolby Vision RPU, XNU kernel IPC, sandbox & filesystem, GPT / kexts, HID / peripherals / radio, entitlement probing.
@@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ Component coverage: ImageIO, CoreGraphics, CoreMedia, FontParser, ArchiveUtility
| Block | Contents |
|---|---|
| `CVE-2026-XXXX/` (31) | One folder per CVE with the POC proper inside: a `.py` seed builder (standalone runnable), a `.swift` seed construction + trigger closures (standalone typecheckable), and a `.c` twin — self-contained seed + trigger + `main()`, compiles and runs standalone on macOS arm64 |
| `CVE-2026-XXXX/` (34) | One folder per CVE with the POC proper inside: a `.py` seed builder (standalone runnable), a `.swift` seed construction + trigger closures (standalone typecheckable), and a `.c` twin — self-contained seed + trigger + `main()`, compiles and runs standalone on macOS arm64 |
| `<module-id>/` (11) | Modules without a CVE number — tools, probes, baselines, sandbox primitives — named by module id, same folder-per-file shape |
| `Sources/` `scripts/` `Resources/` `Info.plist` | The Cinder27 app itself (the verification harness; build below) |
42 Swift POC files (all pass standalone typecheck) + 5 Python seed builders (byte-identical output to the app's built-in seeds) + 31 C POC files (compile clean with `clang -O2 -Wall` on macOS arm64, each with a recorded oracle).
45 Swift POC files (all pass standalone typecheck) + 5 Python seed builders (byte-identical output to the app's built-in seeds) + 34 C POC files (compile clean with `clang -O2 -Wall` on macOS arm64, each with a recorded oracle).
## POC index — 31 CVE folders
## POC index — 34 CVE folders
Composite ids (e.g. `CVE-2026-112627 / 112561`) collapse into the primary id's folder; where one CVE is hit by several modules, the trigger closures sit side by side in the same file.
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ Composite ids (e.g. `CVE-2026-112627 / 112561`) collapse into the primary id's f
| [CVE-2026-112610](CVE-2026-112610/) | `cg.cmap` | CoreGraphics · _cmap_convert | OOB write | in-process | CMap /UseCMap recursion out-of-bounds write (negative-result probe) | `CVE-2026-112610.swift` · `CVE-2026-112610.c` |
| [CVE-2026-112611](CVE-2026-112611/) | `cg.shading`, `cg.shading.sweep` | CoreGraphics · _cg_shading_type5_draw | OOB write | in-process | Type-5 shading stack overflow (value-controlled OOB write) | `CVE-2026-112611.swift` · `CVE-2026-112611.c` |
| [CVE-2026-112619](CVE-2026-112619/) | `cal.unzip` | CalendarFoundation · _UnzipArchiveWithLimits | OOB write | system process | Calendar attachment extraction containment | `CVE-2026-112619.swift` · `CVE-2026-112619.c` |
| [CVE-2026-112621](CVE-2026-112621/) | `lp.heic`, `lp.heic.fire` | LinkPresentation · LPAnimatedImageTranscoder | OOB write | in-process | Link-preview multi-frame size mismatch (later frame taller than the pool) | `CVE-2026-112621.swift` · `CVE-2026-112621.c` |
| [CVE-2026-112625](CVE-2026-112625/) | `iio.ktx2`, `iio.pvr` | ImageIO · KTX2ReadPlugin | integer overflow | in-process | KTX2 dimension and level size arithmetic | `CVE-2026-112625.py` · `CVE-2026-112625.swift` · `CVE-2026-112625.c` |
| [CVE-2026-112627](CVE-2026-112627/) | `iio.dds.bc7`, `iio.appx` | ImageIO · BCReadPlugin::initialize | OOB read | in-process | BC7 texture mip truncation | `CVE-2026-112627.swift` · `CVE-2026-112627.c` |
| [CVE-2026-112629](CVE-2026-112629/) | `iio.jpeg.gps` | ImageIO · GPSCopy::processData | OOB read | in-process | GPS IFD value offset out of bounds | `CVE-2026-112629.swift` · `CVE-2026-112629.c` |
@@ -48,11 +49,13 @@ Composite ids (e.g. `CVE-2026-112627 / 112561`) collapse into the primary id's f
| [CVE-2026-112683](CVE-2026-112683/) | `font.cff` | FontParser · charstring interpreter | OOB write | in-process | CFF Type2 charstring operand stack overflow | `CVE-2026-112683.py` · `CVE-2026-112683.swift` · `CVE-2026-112683.c` |
| [CVE-2026-112688](CVE-2026-112688/) | `cm.rpu`, `cm.rpu.sweep` | CoreMedia · hevcbridgeParseVdrDmDataPayloadExMetadataBlocks | OOB write | system process | Dolby Vision RPU extension metadata block array overrun | `CVE-2026-112688.swift` · `CVE-2026-112688.c` |
| [CVE-2026-112696 / 84494](CVE-2026-112696/) | `probe.ane` | AppleH16ANEInterface | OOB write | kernel | ANE kernel interface reachability | `CVE-2026-112696.swift` · `CVE-2026-112696.c` |
| [CVE-2026-112705](CVE-2026-112705/) | `ave.ntl`, `ave.ntl.fire` | AppleAVE2 · VideoToolbox HEVC encoder | OOB write | kernel | `NumberOfTemporalLayers` 16463 → kernel data abort | `CVE-2026-112705.swift` · `CVE-2026-112705.c` |
| [CVE-2026-112706](CVE-2026-112706/) | `cm.fdleak`, `cm.fdleak.boundary` | CoreMedia · mediaplaybackd.bytestream.xpc | info leak | system process | CoreMedia bytestream XPC cross-sandbox file descriptor acquisition | `CVE-2026-112706.swift` · `CVE-2026-112706.c` |
| [CVE-2026-113907](CVE-2026-113907/) | `aud.haptic`, `aud.immersive` | AudioToolbox · AVHapticServerInstance | OOB write | system process | AVHaptic custom audio event format validation | `CVE-2026-113907.swift` · `CVE-2026-113907.c` |
| [CVE-2026-113910](CVE-2026-113910/) | `kern.decmpfs` | XNU · AppleFSCompressionTypeZlib | info leak | kernel | decmpfs chunked decompression under-produce → kernel heap disclosure | `CVE-2026-113910.swift` · `CVE-2026-113910.c` |
| [CVE-2026-113912 / 86972](CVE-2026-113912/) | `aud.drc` | AudioCodecs · mpddrc::UniDrcSelection | OOB read | system process | MPEG-D DRC downmix matrix coefficient validation | `CVE-2026-113912.swift` · `CVE-2026-113912.c` |
| [CVE-2026-65385](CVE-2026-65385/) | `kext.iohid` | IOKit.framework · IOHIDEventAppendEvent | OOB write | kernel | IOKit event short-heap fixed-offset write | `CVE-2026-65385.swift` · `CVE-2026-65385.c` |
| [CVE-2026-84636](CVE-2026-84636/) | `sc.dynamicstore` | SystemConfiguration · configd dynamic store | info leak | system process | SSID + router MAC without the `wifi-info` entitlement | `CVE-2026-84636.swift` · `CVE-2026-84636.c` |
## Modules without a CVE — 11
@@ -92,7 +95,7 @@ Every CVE folder carries a C twin — the same verification in plain C, compilin
4. **Oracle** — printed to stdout: OSStatus codes, parse-entry refusals, XPC reply types, signal / crash outcomes
5. **`main()`** — argument-parameterised where the Swift version is (depth, block-count, path); the seed file is written to the working directory for inspection
All 31 compile clean with `clang -O2 -Wall` — zero warnings — and each has a recorded oracle from this exact host.
All 34 compile clean with `clang -O2 -Wall` — zero warnings — and each has a recorded oracle from this exact host.
## Running
@@ -128,15 +131,15 @@ bash scripts/build-sim.sh # → build/sim/Cinder27.app (arm64 simulator)
python3 scripts/gen_seeds.py # → seeds/ (the app's built-in seeds, byte-identical to the .py POCs)
```
Device install: bundle id `com.jbjf.cinder27` (v2.0 build 3), unsigned — sign with your own certificate + a matching (or wildcard) provisioning profile, then sideload.
Device install: bundle id `com.jbjf.cinder27` (v2.1 build 4), unsigned — sign with your own certificate + a matching (or wildcard) provisioning profile, then sideload.
## Verification status
Full 51-module regression (simulator build): **47 done + 4 armed**.
Full 56-module regression (simulator build): **50 done + 4 armed + 2 fire modules left unrun by design**. The two fire modules are the deliberate death oracles for 112705 and 112621; they are compiled in and require a tap.
Armed is not a timeout — it is the **death oracle firing**: the payload crashes the process, the journal stays armed, the process vanishes. The cm.rpu / cm.rpu.sweep crash stacks land inside `CMGetDMVersionLevelFromRPU` with SIGSEGV; the C twin pins the mechanism — the iOS surface is the 4-argument `(bytes, count, u32*, u32*)` form, while the macOS export takes a single `CFDataRef` (verified by disassembly: arg0 goes through a CFRetain-style GOT call before `FigHEVCBridge_GetRPUMetadata`), so the Swift 4-arg call dies at entry on the simulator's CoreMedia. cg.shading / cg.shading.sweep are R=136 long-overflow ladder sweeps, by design advancing within one process to the fatal rung.
All 31 C twins compile clean — `clang -O2 -Wall`, zero warnings, macOS arm64 — and each runs with a recorded oracle on the dev host: 112522 raises SIGTRAP (the 2-byte OOB write caught by malloc), 112507 survives the ring race with -300 / invalid-destination receipts, 112706 answers 'Connection invalid' (mediaplaybackd bytestream XPC absent on macOS — silent-service verdict), 112485 surfaces the PEGTL depth receipt (`Expected } at 'def Xform "n1999"'`), 113910 reads back plain 0x41s (decmpfs does not engage for files with existing data). The rest refuse at the entry layer — same receipts as the app harness.
All 34 C twins compile clean — `clang -O2 -Wall`, zero warnings, macOS arm64 — and each runs with a recorded oracle on the dev host: 112522 raises SIGTRAP (the 2-byte OOB write caught by malloc), 112507 survives the ring race with -300 / invalid-destination receipts, 112706 answers 'Connection invalid' (mediaplaybackd bytestream XPC absent on macOS — silent-service verdict), 112485 surfaces the PEGTL depth receipt (`Expected } at 'def Xform "n1999"'`), 113910 reads back plain 0x41s (decmpfs does not engage for files with existing data). The three arrivals add their own receipts: 112621 builds the 256×16 → 256×48 container and the 48-row clear faults at a guard page exactly 32,768 bytes past the 16,384-byte pool; 84636 enumerates configd's `State:/Network` tree and reads `Global/DNS` and the primary service while `CNCopyCurrentNetworkInfo` is unavailable on the host — on a device the same call returns nil without the entitlement. 112705 compiles but is never executed on the host: its `.c` carries a `--force-host` gate because a frame submit reaches the same AppleAVE2 driver that panicked this Mac, and the app splits it into a property probe plus a separate fire module. The rest refuse at the entry layer — same receipts as the app harness.
## Module semantics