// cm.fdleak · CoreMedia · mediaplaybackd.bytestream.xpc · CVE-2026-112706 // 原语: 信息泄露 · 系统进程 · tier 1 // Primitive: info leak · system process · tier 1 // // [zh] CoreMedia bytestream XPC 跨沙盒文件描述符获取 // // [en] CoreMedia bytestream XPC cross-sandbox file descriptor acquisition // The launchd service com.apple.coremedia.mediaplaybackd.bytestream.xpc is reachable from any sandboxed // third-party app, checks no entitlement and raises no permission prompt. Its FigXPC memory-origin // handshake (.rp1 → .rp2 → .org) returns status 0 for an unprivileged client; the subsequent 'Curl' // create message carries a client-chosen absolute file:// path in CreationURL, and the daemon opens // that path with its own credentials without checking either that it lies inside the requesting app's // container or that the requester can read it. The reply's ByteStreamDetails dictionary carries a // live FileDescriptor. The app dups it and preads — descriptor-level I/O is not subject to the client // sandbox's path checks, so the full contents of a file the app's own open() returns EPERM for land // in the app container. // ── 判别 / oracle ── // 变体 cm.fdleak.boundary: 跨沙盒可读域边界测绘 import Foundation // ── byte helpers — verbatim from Cinder27 Sources/Kit.swift ── enum B { static func be16(_ v: UInt16) -> [UInt8] { [UInt8(v >> 8 & 0xff), UInt8(v & 0xff)] } static func le16(_ v: UInt16) -> [UInt8] { [UInt8(v & 0xff), UInt8(v >> 8 & 0xff)] } static func be32(_ v: UInt32) -> [UInt8] { [UInt8(v >> 24 & 0xff), UInt8(v >> 16 & 0xff), UInt8(v >> 8 & 0xff), UInt8(v & 0xff)] } static func le32(_ v: UInt32) -> [UInt8] { [UInt8(v & 0xff), UInt8(v >> 8 & 0xff), UInt8(v >> 16 & 0xff), UInt8(v >> 24 & 0xff)] } static func be64(_ v: UInt64) -> [UInt8] { (0..<8).map { UInt8((v >> (56 - UInt64($0) * 8)) & 0xff) } } static func le64(_ v: UInt64) -> [UInt8] { (0..<8).map { UInt8((v >> (UInt64($0) * 8)) & 0xff) } } static func both16(_ v: UInt16) -> [UInt8] { le16(v) + be16(v) } static func both32(_ v: UInt32) -> [UInt8] { le32(v) + be32(v) } static func ascii(_ s: String) -> [UInt8] { Array(s.utf8) } } /* // cm.fdleak.boundary · CoreMedia · mediaplaybackd.bytestream.xpc · CVE-2026-112706 // 原语: 探测 · 系统进程 · tier 2 // Primitive: probe · system process · tier 2 // // [zh] 跨沙盒可读域边界测绘 // // [en] Cross-sandbox readable domain boundary mapping // Fifteen high-value targets are each given a 'Curl' probe and the daemon's server-side error code // is recorded, fixing the primitive's actual readable domain. Three outcomes are distinguished: opens, // exists but denied (-12203), does not exist (-17913). The value of this pass is that it leaves // the negative results on record — a target that was refused and a target that was never tested are // entirely different conclusions. */